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ABSTRACT 
Researcher: Harold Dale Townsend 
Title: Effect of Air Carrier Restructuring Strategies on Post-bankruptcy 
Performance  
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation 
Year: 2014 
Air carrier bankruptcy is a common occurrence in the aviation industry.  
However, there is a paucity of research on the topic of air carrier restructuring during the 
post-bankruptcy period.  General restructuring literature has identified four types of 
actions: operational, financial, managerial, and portfolio.  The purpose of this study was 
to partially fill the large literature gap in the area of air carrier post-bankruptcy 
performance through theoretical and practical contributions.    
A multilevel exploratory factor analysis was conducted to explore whether the 
same restructuring areas were found in air carrier specific metrics.  All four restructuring 
areas were found in the factor analysis.  Next, multilevel modeling was conducted to 
determine whether each restructuring action had a significant impact on post-bankruptcy 
performance.  The dependent variable used for analysis was the P-Score, an air carrier 
distress measure.  Independent variables were air carrier specific, derived from literature 
to measure restructuring strategies.  The restructuring period was defined as the quarter of 
bankruptcy filing until three years after emerging from bankruptcy protection.  U.S. 
Department of Transportation financial and operational data from the total population of 
25 large air carriers that have emerged from bankruptcy protection was used for analysis.   
 v 
Operational, financial, and portfolio restructuring were found to have a significant 
impact on post-bankruptcy performance during the post-bankruptcy period.  Managerial 
restructuring was not found to be significant during the post-bankruptcy period.   
Additional research of managerial restructuring is needed to better understand this 
strategy among distressed air carriers.  To improve air carrier performance during 
bankruptcy and restructuring, management should attempt to reduce the cost of transport, 
consider deleveraging, and acquire debtor-in-possession financing.   
This study has contributed theoretically and practically to air carrier restructuring 
theory.  This is the first study to explore air carrier specific restructuring metrics for 
underlying factors and the first to measure restructuring strategies in all large air carriers 
that have emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Additionally, this study is the first to 
apply multilevel modeling to bankruptcy restructuring research.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
At his 2013 shareholder meeting, investor Warren Buffett described the airline 
industry as being labor-intensive, capital-intensive with high fixed costs that has “…been 
a death trap for investors since Orville took off” (Q & A period).  The U.S. airline 
industry’s average of six bankruptcies per year since 1978 is indicative of the death trap 
Warren Buffett refers to (Figure 1).  Air carrier bankruptcy is often a last resort for a 
failing airline and, for some, results in liquidation of the firm. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Number of Airline bankruptcies. Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcies since 
1978.  
 
 
 
The Chapter 11 bankruptcy process is an opportunity for an air carrier to 
restructure and emerge as a successful firm.  However, emerging from bankruptcy is not 
a guarantee of a successful future.  Since the Airline Deregulation Act was passed in 
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1978, four airlines, Braniff, Continental, U.S. Airways, and Trans World Airways have 
each filed for bankruptcy twice (Airlines for America, 2013).  To improve performance 
during the post-bankruptcy period, it is imperative that bankrupt airlines have a strong 
and effective plan for restructuring to maximize profit and minimize the impact on 
stakeholders.   
Many stakeholders, including air travelers, can be affected with one air carrier 
declaring bankruptcy, the four largest U.S. air carriers (Delta Air Lines, American 
Airlines, United Airlines, and Southwest Airlines) transport 70% of the U.S. market share 
as measured by revenue passenger miles (RPM).  Of these four, only Southwest Airlines 
has not been through the bankruptcy process.  Air carrier bankruptcy is not uncommon in 
the industry and, thus, warrants a thorough understanding of effective restructuring 
strategies to improve the future of emerging air carriers.    
The study of airline pre-bankruptcy conditions and accurate methods of predicting 
air carrier bankruptcy has been well researched; some of the models developed are: 
Altman Z Score model, Altman ZETA model, AIRSCORE model, Pilarski model, Neural 
Networks, Genetic Algorithms, Gudmundsson model, and “Fuzzy” Logic models (Gritta, 
Adrangi, Davalos, & Bright, 2008).  These quantitative models have been derived using 
financial and non-financial information to measure the condition of an airline.  While 
literature has thoroughly addressed pre-bankruptcy performance, the area of air carrier 
post-bankruptcy performance has been mostly ignored.   
Air carrier reorganization and turnaround research is sparse and, the three existing 
studies are each presented as a case study (Lawton, Rajwani & O’Kane, 2011) (Sipika & 
Smith, 1993) (Bethune & Huler, 1998).  Lawton, Rajwani and O’Kane, (2011) studied six 
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non-U.S. air carriers, Sipika and Smith (1993) reviewed Pan American World Airways, 
and Bethune and Huler (1998) recounted the turnaround of Continental Airlines.  A 
common finding among studies was the need for profit maximization and cost control.  
Other strategies identified included managerial replacement, staff and culture 
improvement, product quality enhancement, and strategic alliances or consolidation.  
While case studies provide an in-depth analysis of the specific air carriers, no large 
sample studies have been conducted to find relationships between strategy and 
performance among all restructuring air carriers.  
Unfortunately, existing non-air carrier turnaround literature has numerous 
inconsistencies and is empirically inconclusive.  In 2000, Pandit summarized the state of 
turnaround research, “Despite the frequent incidence of corporate turnaround and over 
two decades of research effort, our understanding of the phenomenon is very incomplete” 
(p.1).  Ten years later, Eichner (2010) reached the same conclusion that research on 
turnaround strategies for overcoming financial distress remained weak. 
An example of the inconsistency is shown in the adoption of managerial 
restructuring, where the chief executive officer (CEO) is replaced.  Sudarsanamam and 
Lai (2001) and Smith and Graves (2005) find no support for replacing upper management 
during restructuring, while Hotchkiss (1995) found that retaining pre-bankruptcy 
management was strongly related to worse post-bankruptcy performance.   
To improve air carrier turnaround literature, this study will examine the four 
restructuring areas of operational, managerial, financial, and portfolio/asset as proposed 
by Sudarsanamam and Lai (2001).  These strategies have been applied to distressed firms 
(Eichner, 2010) and to bankrupt firms (Naujoks, 2012).  The implementation of these 
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strategies will be measured in large air carriers during the reorganization period of three 
years after emerging from Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
The impact of these restructuring strategies will be measured by air carrier 
performance.  Performance is measured by an air carrier specific stress indicator called 
Pilarksi’s P-Score.  Pilarski and Dinh (1999) developed the econometric model by 
including the best predictors from financial ratios and specific air carrier variables.  The 
P-Score is the probability of bankruptcy; the higher the P value, the greater the financial 
stress and chance of failure.  The P-Score is the logarithmic function of W, a combined 
value of asset productivity, capital adequacy, leverage, liquidity, and profitability.  The 
value W will be used as the dependent variable for this study as it is more easily 
interpreted for analysis, comparability, and is less skewed than P-Score. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
The problem in the air carrier industry is best summarized by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2005): 
Bankruptcy is endemic to the airline industry, owing to long-standing structural 
challenges and weak financial performance in the industry.  Structurally, the 
industry is characterized by high fixed costs, cyclical demand for its services, and 
intense competition.  Consequently, since deregulation in 1978, there have been 
162 airline bankruptcy filings, 22 of them in the last five years.  Airlines have 
used bankruptcy in response to liquidity pressures and as a means to restructure 
their costs.  Our analysis of major airline bankruptcies shows mixed results in 
being able to significantly reduce costs—most but not all airlines were able to do 
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so.  However, bankruptcy is not a panacea for airlines.  Few have emerged from 
bankruptcy and are still operating.  (p. 1) 
This high frequency of air carrier bankruptcy and the unsuccessful restructuring of air 
carriers demand further research.  However, literature provides no specific air carrier 
guidance for restructuring.  No study has analyzed restructuring airlines to determine how 
bankrupt air carriers recovered and whether generic restructuring strategies apply.  Air 
carrier bankruptcy remains an issue that requires further analysis. 
 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study is to measure the effectiveness and impact of operational, 
managerial, financial, and portfolio restructuring strategies on post-bankruptcy 
performance of air carriers emerging from Chapter 11 by answering the following 
question: 
How does the implementation of the operational, managerial, financial, and 
portfolio, restructuring strategies improve air carrier post-bankruptcy performance 
during the restructuring period? 
 
Significance of the Study 
This study will contribute theoretically and practically to air carrier restructuring 
theory.  Theoretical contributions include being the first study to explore air carrier 
specific restructuring metrics for underlying factors.  Additionally, this study is the first 
to measure restructuring strategies in all large air carriers that have emerged from 
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Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Results from this study may also further understanding of the 
inconsistencies found in non-air carrier studies.  
Practical contributions of this study include providing stakeholders, owners, debt 
holders, and management of a bankrupt air carrier guidance for restructuring.  The GAO 
(2005) reported that bankruptcy is not a panacea for airlines as few have emerged and are 
still operating.  Practical value is created when a bankrupt air carrier’s management can 
see the effects of air carrier-restructuring actions in previous bankruptcies and apply these 
lessons from the past.  This study will help fill the large literature gap in the area of air 
carrier post-bankruptcy performance through theoretical and practical contributions.    
 
Research Questions 
Four research questions will be investigated to better understand the contribution 
of operational, financial, managerial, and portfolio restructuring to post-bankruptcy 
performance.     
RQ1: What is the relationship between operational restructuring on post-
bankruptcy performance during the post-bankruptcy period? 
RQ2: What is the relationship between financial restructuring on post-bankruptcy 
performance during the post-bankruptcy period? 
RQ3: What is the relationship between managerial restructuring on post-
bankruptcy performance during the post-bankruptcy period?  
RQ4: What is the relationship between portfolio restructuring on post-bankruptcy 
performance during the post-bankruptcy period? 
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Delimitations  
This study will focus specifically on large U.S. air carriers emerging from Chapter 
11 bankruptcy.  U.S. air carriers are selected to limit variability associated with 
international differences in financial reporting and classification of bankruptcy.   
Large U.S. air carriers are defined by the U.S. Department of Transportation 
(2013) as operating aircraft over 60 seats or with a payload greater than 18,000 pounds; 
these are selected due to their required quarterly reporting of financial and operational 
results.  Additionally, large air carriers are more likely to have news coverage of 
restructuring activities. 
Data for this study were collected during the period of 1979 to 2012.  Limiting 
data collection post-1978 insures that air carriers are compared in the same deregulated 
environment.  Prior to deregulation, air carrier bankruptcy was rare (Airlines for 
America, 2013).  Deregulation lifted restraints on entry into the industry, pricing, and 
route structure (Heuer & Vogel, 1991). 
 
Limitations and Assumptions 
The most limiting factor in this study is the lack of data.  While many air carriers 
have declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy, only 25 large air carriers have emerged.  Most of 
the recent bankruptcies (e.g., American Airlines) are not included due to lack of post-
bankruptcy data as they have not emerged from bankruptcy protection or have very 
recently emerged.  To maximize the number of air carriers available for analysis, a large 
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time period is used (1979 – 2012).  While only 25 large air carriers are used for analysis, 
this encompasses the entire population. 
This study also assumes that it is appropriate to combine data for both passenger 
carriers and cargo carriers.  All metrics selected are appropriate for measuring both types 
of air carriers.  A further factor that is not separately analyzed is whether the air carrier 
was initially a legacy air carrier, existing prior to deregulation, or a new startup.  With 
more data, these distinctions could be explored. 
 
Definitions of Terms 
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy where assets are liquidated and claimants are 
paid based on a hierarchical order.  Once all debt holders 
are repaid, any remaining funds are returned to the 
owners/shareholders (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy where the failed firm has an opportunity to 
restructure operations, capital, management, business 
segments, or other areas of the company while being 
protected from creditors  (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
Insolvency Exists when a business is unable to cover its current debt 
indicating a lack of liquidity (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
Form 41 Report The schedule of forms submitted monthly, quarterly, 
semiannually, and annually to the U.S. Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics (BTS) by each large certificated 
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air carrier subject to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 2013). 
Large air carrier An air carrier holding a certificate issued under 49 
U.S.C.41102, as amended, that: (1) Operates aircraft 
designed to have a maximum passenger capacity of more 
than 60 seats or a maximum payload capacity of more than 
18,000 pounds; or (2) conducts operations where one or 
both terminals of a flight stage are outside the 50 states of 
the United States, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands 
(U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013). 
Major air carrier Annual revenue greater than $1 billion (U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 2013). 
National air carrier Annual revenue between $100 million and $1 billion (U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 2013). 
Post-bankruptcy The period after emerging from bankruptcy protection.  For 
this study, the post-bankruptcy period is three years from 
emergence. 
Regional air carrier Annual revenue less than $100 million (U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 2013). 
Restructuring Refers to the operational, financial, managerial, or portfolio 
actions taken during the turnaround process. 
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Turnaround Refers to the process of returning a distressed firm to 
profitability through the implementation of restructuring 
actions. 
List of Acronyms 
AAC Available ton miles flown per aircraft 
AIC Akaike Information Criterion  
ANOVA Analysis of variance 
ASM Available seat mile 
ASTS Total assets 
ATM Available ton mile 
BIC Bayesian Information Criterion 
BTS U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
CASM Cost per available seat mile 
CATM Cost per available ton mile 
CAPEX Capital expenditure 
CEO Chief executive officer 
DFTE Departures per full-time equivalent 
DIP Debtor in possession 
DIPC Amount of debtor in possession financing 
DOT U.S. Department of Transportation 
EBITD Earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation 
EBITDA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
FLET Fleet count 
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FTE Full-time equivalent 
GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office 
HAC Hours flown per aircraft 
ICC Interclass correlations 
LF Load factor 
MACFT Miles flown per aircraft 
MEFA Multilevel exploratory factor analysis 
MFA Multilevel factor analysis 
MFTE Miles flown per full-time equivalent 
MLM Multilevel modeling 
MSE Mean Squared Error 
OPEC Of petroleum exporting countries  
RASM Revenue per available seat mile 
RATM Revenue per available ton mile 
RITA Research and Innovative Technology Administration 
RPM Revenue passenger mile 
RQ Research question 
RTM Revenue ton mile 
SARS Severe acute respiratory syndrome 
SEC U.S. Security Exchange Commission 
U.S. United States of America 
WC Working capital 
WSCR Dependent variable W-Score 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Air Carrier Bankruptcy History 
During the regulated airline environment prior to 1978, airline bankruptcies were 
very rare (Airlines for America, 2013).  In 1978, President Carter signed the Airline 
Deregulation Act deregulating the industry.  Deregulation only lifted restraints on entry 
into the industry, pricing, and route structure; the airline industry remains heavily 
regulated in other areas (Heuer & Vogel, 1991).   
The overriding theme of the act was competition.  There was to be maximum 
reliance on competition to attain the objectives of efficiency, innovation, low 
prices, and price and service options while still providing the needed air 
transportation system.  Competitive market forces and actual and potential 
competition were to encourage efficient and well-managed carriers to earn 
adequate profits and to attract capital. (Wensveen, 2011, p.72) 
In 1979 and 1980 air carrier bankruptcies were attributed to the OPEC oil 
embargo, economic recession, high interest rates, and air traffic controller strike, 
handicapping the industry (Heuer & Vogel, 1991).  Inefficient air carriers struggled when 
regulation protecting them from competition was removed.  Defending deregulation, the 
Southwest Airlines CEO said the problems among airlines were caused by factors unseen 
to Congress – high interest rates, high fuel prices, and highly leveraged airlines with 
rising costs (Heuer & Vogel, 1991).     
“Where deregulation has failed, bankruptcy has adequately filled the gap” (Heuer 
& Vogel, 1991, p. 14).  Bankruptcy has kept some airlines flying, sold off assets of others 
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that failed, and balanced the interests of all parties (Heuer & Vogel, 1991).  Deregulation 
has given airline management the latitude to make errors and the opportunity to operate 
without price and route limitations (Heuer & Vogel, 1991). 
 
Air Carrier Bankruptcy 
The air carrier industry today remains challenging.  To remain solvent, air carriers 
must maintain a consistent cash flow to support highly leveraged balance sheets while 
relying on volatile revenue streams from cyclical demand (Pilarski & Dinh, 1999).  The 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2005) attributes the harsh air carrier 
industry environment to high fixed costs, cyclical demand for services, intense 
competition, and vulnerability to external shocks.  Powerful labor unions have also been 
successful at pushing U.S. airline employee compensation to twice the average for all 
U.S. industries (Ben-Yosef, 2005).  
The dismal financial performance of air carriers has been explained as a 
disequilibrium problem known as an empty core (Tacker, 2009; Telser, 1994; 
Bittlingmayer, 1990; Button, 1996; Antoniou, 1998; Nyshadham & Raghavan, 2001).  
The empty core situation results from the inability to divide production and demand in an 
oligopoly. 
To illustrate an empty core in simplest terms, suppose that a given industry’s cost 
structure and demand are such that if there are two firms in the industry they will 
earn above normal profits but that entry by a third firm will result in profits below 
normal.  Thus, normal long run equilibrium is unattainable while short run 
outcomes are unpredictable.  One possible result is perpetual losses if competition 
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for the field routinely results in too many firms in the field.  However, this 
situation can also lead to perpetual undersupply, even zero supply if firms 
eventually abandon an industry prone to horrendous losses. (Tacker, 2009, p. 71) 
The most recent major air carrier bankruptcy filed in November 2011 was 
American Airlines.  According to Standard & Poor’s (Corridore, 2013) this was an 
attempt to preserve cash balances after the airline was unable to negotiate labor 
concessions with unions by strategically protecting cash from pilot retirements, losses, 
and debt repayments (Corridore, 2013).  While other airlines had recently reduced costs 
through reorganization, American Airlines was unable to reduce costs enough to remain 
competitive.  American Airlines was preceded by Delta and Northwest Airlines which 
each had large cash balances prior to their own Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings (Corridore, 
2013). 
Upon filing for bankruptcy, American Airlines announced the replacement of the 
CEO and has since negotiated a merger with US Airways that will make it the largest 
airline worldwide (Corridore, 2013).  Once the American Airlines merger is complete, it 
will reduce the number of major airlines in the United States to four: American (merged 
with US Airways), United (merged with Continental in 2011), Delta (merged with 
Northwest in 2008), and Southwest (merged with AirTran in 2011).  
The recent consolidation of airlines is reducing the oversupply of air travel to a 
more sustainable and stable level.  Airline strategy is shifting from market share gains to 
sustained profitability (Corridore, 2013).  After suffering years of losses, airlines may be 
focusing on capacity control and airfare pricing to generate sustainable profitability rather 
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than maintaining market share (Corridore, 2013).  This shift toward profitability may 
strengthen the financial condition of air carriers in the future. 
 
Air Carrier Bankruptcy Process.  The purpose of bankruptcy is to: (a) protect 
the contractual rights of stakeholders, (b) liquate unproductive assets, and (c) provide an 
atmosphere where the debtor can restructure and emerge as a going concern (Altman & 
Hotchkiss, 2006).  The decision to liquidate or reorganize is based on the value of the 
firm; if the intrinsic value of the firm is greater than the liquidation value, the company 
should be reorganized; otherwise, the firm should be liquidated (Altman & Hotchkiss, 
2006).   
The GAO (2005) cautioned that bankruptcy is not a panacea for air carriers; few 
air carriers have emerged that are still operating.  Air carrier bankruptcies are different 
from other industries because they last longer and are more likely to end in liquidation 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005).    
Dowdel (2006) argues that Chapter 11 is a competitive strategy for air carriers at 
the expense of competitors, employees, retirees, and other stakeholders.  Instead of using 
bankruptcy to cut costs of unnecessary layers of management or streamline operations, 
bankrupt air carriers prolong their protection in bankruptcy court.  Some airlines justify 
bankruptcy because competitors are already operating under bankruptcy protection, and 
there is no other way to effectively compete (Dowdel, 2006).  Dowdell (2006) refers to 
Northwest Airlines’ filing for bankruptcy as a competitive strategy because it had $1 
billion in cash and current assets.  Dowdel (2006) also found that airlines in bankruptcy 
protection reduce fares and expand routes once the debt burden has been lifted. 
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Contradictory to Dowdel’s (2006) results, Ciliberto and Schenone (2012) 
analyzed airline product and market response during bankruptcy and found that carriers 
reduce routes (by 25%), reduce markets (by 26%), reduce flight frequency (by 21%), and 
reduce fare price (by 3.1%).  After emerging from bankruptcy, they found that only fare 
price increased (5%) over the pre-bankruptcy metrics.  Chapter 11 allows airlines to 
adjust capacity without incurring major costs from contract violations with gate leases, 
hangars, and aircraft.  While in bankruptcy, airlines can implement strategies that are 
illegal outside of court protection (Ciliberto and Schenone, 2012).  A carrier can default 
on aircraft leases, and after a 60 day grace period, the lessor then repossesses the aircraft 
but usually renegotiates payments rather than find a new lessor.  The carrier can 
selectively default on leases of older aircraft with the intent of reducing the aircraft fleet 
age.  Ciliberto and Schenone (2012) found the average age of the fleet decreases 9% 
while in bankruptcy as the new, more comfortable, higher quality, and more efficient 
aircraft remain. 
Phillips and Sertsios (2011) find that bankrupt air carriers increase product quality 
above pre-bankruptcy levels in an attempt to retain customers and invest in the reputation 
of the air carrier. In similar research, the quality of airline service increases during 
bankruptcy as canceled flights decrease by 8% but then returns to pre-bankruptcy levels 
after emerging (Ciliberto & Schenone, 2012).   
 
Bankruptcy Defined.  Financial distress is often associated with a number of 
terms that are frequently misunderstood.  A business failure describes a business that 
voluntarily or involuntarily ceases operations leaving unpaid obligations or is involved in 
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court actions of reorganization (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).  A business entity may be 
economically failed but continue to operate and not be classified as a business failure if 
there is a lack of legally enforceable debt (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).    
Insolvency or technical insolvency exists when a business is unable to cover its 
current debt indicating a lack of liquidity (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).  This may be a 
temporary condition where the firm lacks cash to meet current obligations even though 
assets in total may be greater than total debt.  However, insolvency can also be more 
permanent when the overall net worth of the firm is negative; that is, total debt exceeds 
total assets.  The term deepening insolvency is a more recent concept where the judicial 
system allows a firm to continue operating at the expense of the estate (Altman & 
Hotchkiss, 2006).  Such was the case with Eastern Airlines, where the bankruptcy court 
essentially subsidized operations when the judge allowed the airline to continue operating 
and, as a result, lost 50% of its value while in bankruptcy before eventually liquidating 
(Weiss & Wruck, 1996).  “The failure of Eastern’s Chapter 11 demonstrates the 
importance of having a bankruptcy process that protects a distressed firm’s assets, not 
simply from a run by creditors, but also from overly optimistic managers and misguided 
judges” (Weiss & Wruck, 1996, p. 55). 
Default indicates a breach of contract between debtor and creditor (Altman & 
Hotchkiss, 2006).  Violations can be a result of missed payment or worsening financial 
conditions that cause key ratios to fall below levels specified in the loan covenants 
(Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).  While a default caused by worsening financial ratios 
usually only results in a renegotiation of contract, a missed loan payment is more severe 
and could result in stronger penalties (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).  Frontier Airlines filed 
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for bankruptcy in 2008 due to its credit card processor holding back proceeds from ticket 
sales (Bowely, 2008).  Frontier president and chief executive, Sean Menke, explained: 
Unfortunately, our principal credit card processor, very recently and unexpectedly 
informed us that, beginning on April 11, it intended to start withholding 
significant proceeds received from the sale of Frontier tickets, he said.  This 
change in established practices would have represented a material change to our 
cash forecasts and business plan.  Unchecked, it would have put severe restraints 
on Frontier’s liquidity and would have made it impossible for us to continue 
normal operations.  (Bowely, 2008, p. 1) 
A firm that continues to operate and renegotiate with creditors after defaulting on 
a loan due to a missed payment is undertaking distressed restructuring (Altman & 
Hotchkiss, 2006).  Negotiations can occur with many creditors, and the firm may avoid 
formally declaring and filing bankruptcy.  The term bankruptcy can refer to the previous 
definition of insolvency, where a firm’s net worth is negative, or describe the formal 
declaration of bankruptcy with a federal district court (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).   
 
Bankruptcy Reform Act.  The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 contains eight 
chapters: 1 (General Provisions), 3 (Case Administration), 5 (Creditors, the Debtor, and 
the Estate), 7 (Liquidation), 9 (Adjustment of Municipality Debt), 11 (Reorganization), 
13 (Adjustments of Debts of Individuals with Regular Income), 15 (U.S. Trustee 
Program).  Air carriers can file Chapter 7 or 11; this study focuses on air carriers 
emerging from Chapter 11. 
 
19 
 
Liquidation under Chapter 7.  Liquidation is justified when the assets of the firm 
sold individually are more valuable than the capitalized value of the firm existing in the 
marketplace (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).  Rarely do all creditors receive payment in full 
during the liquidation process.  Claimants are paid based on a hierarchical order and, 
once all debt holders are repaid, any remaining funds are returned to the 
owners/shareholders.  
 
Reorganization under Chapter 11.  Reorganization is an opportunity for a failed 
firm to restructure operations, capital, management, business segments, or other areas of 
the company while being protected from creditors.  Once in bankruptcy the debtor must 
submit a reorganization plan within 120 days; it is the debtor’s responsibility to provide 
burden of proof as to why the firm should not be liquidated (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).  
The average time in bankruptcy for Chapter 11 firms, across all industries, is almost 2 
years (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
Chapter 11 cases must be filed in good faith (Heuer & Vogel, 1991).  If a case is 
filed in bad faith with the sole purpose for modifying or rejecting a collective bargaining 
agreement with unions, it will not be allowed.  However, it is within the debtor’s right to 
reject collective bargaining agreements if it furthers other legitimate bankruptcy 
objectives (Heuer & Vogel, 1991).  One of the most difficult issues in bankruptcy is 
striking a balance in labor contracts (GAO, 2005).  Labor contracts are often modified in 
legacy air carrier bankruptcies because the air carriers have been so constrained by 
unaffordable labor costs and union work rules that, without relief, reorganization would 
not be possible (GAO, 2005).   
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To save time and reduce costs, a failing firm may renegotiate with creditors and, 
upon agreement of new terms, file a prepackaged reorganization plan.  The main 
advantage of a prepackaged plan is that the firm has control over formulating its exit 
strategy from bankruptcy.  The disadvantages include paying necessary fees in cash, 
advertising the firm’s problems to the public, and giving creditors time to begin 
collection efforts prior to the protection afforded under bankruptcy (Altman & Hotchkiss, 
2006). 
 
Restructuring Plan.  In Chapter 11, public companies do not have to file 
financial statements to meet SEC requirements, but instead must provide financial 
information to the court.  When submitting a reorganization proposal, it includes a plan of 
reorganization and a disclosure statement (Michel, Shaked, & McHugh, 1998).  Before 
being approved, the reorganization plan must be accepted by each debtor class.  If a 
debtor does not accept the reorganization plan, the court can force the debtor to accept the 
plan if the debtor is as well off through reorganization as through liquidation (Hotchkiss, 
1993).  The debtor’s strongest weapon under bankruptcy protection can be to delay filing 
the reorganization plan as the time value of money will force creditors to capitulate 
(Weiss & Wruck, 1996).  Once the reorganization plan has been accepted, the firm 
emerges from the protection of Chapter 11 and enters the post-bankruptcy phase. 
 
Post-bankruptcy.  The post-bankruptcy period begins as the firm emerges from 
protection of the bankruptcy court.  The length of this period has been defined in various 
studies as ranging between two and five years (Eichner, 2010).  Das and LeClere (2003) 
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found in a study of 194 firms that only 3% required four of more years to recover.  A 
typical time period to measure for post-bankruptcy success has been three years after 
emerging from bankruptcy (see Naujoks (2012), Denis and Rogers (2007) and Hotchkiss 
(1995)). 
 
Turnaround Process 
The formal declaration of bankruptcy, acceptance of the reorganization plan, and 
the emergence from bankruptcy are milestones in the turnaround process.  However, the 
actual turnaround process may have begun prior to declaring bankruptcy when the firm 
initially began to recognize problems.  The eventual bankruptcy filing is an indicator of 
the severity of the situation.  Turnaround strategies may be initiated, and the firm could 
recover without entering bankruptcy.  
Existing turnaround literature proposes a number of strategies for saving failing 
firms.  Arogyaswamy, Barker, and Yasai-Ardekani (1995) proposed that the turnaround 
process consists of two stages.  The first stage reverses and halts the firm’s decline while 
the second stage positions the firm to compete in the future.  To successfully recover, 
management must support both stages. 
 
Restructuring Strategies.  Unsuccessful turnarounds lack planning and attention 
to restructuring strategies (O'Neill, 1986).  It is important that the strategy selected be 
appropriate for the cause of the decline (O'Neill, 1986).  Researchers have proposed 
many strategies in existing turnaround literature as summarized in Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 1.  Non-industry Specific Restructuring Strategies in Literature. 
Non-industry Specific 
Literature Restructuring Strategies/Process 
O'Neill, 1986 
Management 
Cutback 
Growth 
Restructuring 
Hofer, 1980 
Revenue increasing 
Cost reduction 
Asset reduction 
Ofek, 1992 
Operational 
Management changes 
Organizational strategy and 
structure 
Financial debt-restructuring 
Robbins and Pearce, 
1992 
Retrenchment 
Recovery 
Kamel, 2005 
Management 
Optimizing company size 
Restructuring 
Growth 
Bibeault, 1981 
Management change 
Evaluation 
Emergency 
Stabilization 
Return-to-normal-growth 
Lai & Sudarsanam, 
1997 
Operational restructuring 
Asset restructuring 
Managerial restructuring 
Financial restructuring 
Combination strategies 
Naujoks, 2012 
Operational 
Financial 
Managerial 
Portfolio 
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Table 2.  Air Carrier Specific Restructuring Strategies in Literature. 
Airline Specific 
Case Study Air Carriers Strategies 
Lawton, 
Rajwani, & 
O'Kane, 2011 
Aeroflot Russian Airlines Operating response 
Air Canada  Leadership renewal 
All Nippon Airways  Quality of service 
Linea Aeropostal Santiago-Arica  Profit maximization 
Qantas  Staff development 
TAM Linhas Aereas Thai Airways 
International Strategic response 
Turkish Airlines  Alliance networks 
    Regional consolidation 
Bethune & 
Huler, 1998 
Continental Airlines 
Market 
Financial 
Product 
People 
Sipika & Smith, 
1993 
Pan American World Airways 
Defensive phase 
 Contingency planning 
 Communications 
 Coupling and complexity 
Consolidation phase 
 Cost 
 Control 
Offensive phase 
 Configuration 
  Culture 
 
 
Lai and Sudarsanam (1997) classified restructuring strategies into four categories: 
operational, financial, managerial, and portfolio.   
A firm facing performance decline may choose operational restructuring to 
improve its efficiency and profitability, asset sales to raise cash to meet its 
financial commitments to, say, lenders, renegotiate its debt to relieve the 
immediate burden of financial commitments, issue new equity to finance its 
operations or reconfigure its business strategy by making strategic disposals of 
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businesses or investing in new business.  A precondition to firm revival may often 
be the removal of existing management.  These strategies may be grouped broadly 
into an operational, asset, financial, and managerial restructuring. (Lai and 
Sudarsanam, 1997, p.197)   
 
The restructuring strategies proposed by other studies (Tables 1 and 2) are similar 
to these four categories.  Eichner (2010) further validated the usage of these strategies 
and the affect on performance during firm turnarounds.  Naujoks (2012) used the basic 
strategies proposed by Lai and Sudarsanam (1997) for poor performing firms and applied 
them to bankrupt firms.  He sought to understand how effective select restructuring 
strategies were to post-bankruptcy performance.  Building from Lai and Sudarsanam 
strategies (Table 3), Naujoks (2012) defined each strategy as shown in Table 4.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
Table 3. Restructuring Strategies proposed by Lai and Sudarsanam (1997). 
Strategy Definition 
 Operational restructuring  
  
Operational restructuring Cost rationalization, layoffs, closures and 
integration of business units. 
  Asset restructuring   
  
Asset sales Divestment of subsidiaries, management 
buy-outs, spin-offs, sale-and-leaseback, 
and other asset sales. 
  Acquisitions Full and partial acquisitions of businesses. 
  
Capital expenditure Internal capital expenditure on fixed assets 
such as plant and machinery. 
  Managerial restructuring   
  
Managerial restructuring Removal of Chairman or Chief Executive 
Officer. 
  Financial restructuring   
  
Dividend cut or omission Omission or reduction of dividends from 
previous year. 
  Equity issue Issue of equity for cash. 
  
Debt restructuring Debt refinancing involving extending, 
converting, or forgiving of debt and 
interest. 
  Combination strategies   
    Cash generative actions Asset sales and cash equity issue. 
 
Note.  Adapted from “Corporate Restructuring in Response to Performance Decline: 
Impact of Ownership, Governance and Lenders”, by Lai and Sudarsanam, 1997, 
European Finance Review, 1(2), p. 197-233.   
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Table 4.  Restructuring Strategies measured by Naujoks (2012). 
Strategy Variable Definition 
 
Sales increase Increase in net sales or revenues by at 
least 10% compared to reference period. 
Operational 
Cost reduction Reduction of costs by at least 10% 
compared to reference period. 
 
Personnel reduction Reduction in number of employees by at 
least 10% compared to reference period. 
  
CAPEX increase (reduction) Increase (reduction) in capital 
expenditures over total assets by at least 
10% compared to reference period. 
Financial 
Leverage reduction Reduction in leverage ratio by at least 
10% compared to reference period. 
Equity Issue Mentioning of completed issue of new 
equity in return for cash.  Includes private 
placements and public offerings as well 
as rights offering for common or 
preferred stock. 
  
DIP financing Mentioning of the provision of debtor-in-
possession financing during Chapter 11. 
Managerial 
Top Executive Change Mentioning of the initial change in the 
top executive position of CEO or 
president. 
Portfolio 
Acquisition Mentioning of a closed majority 
acquisition. 
  Divestment Mentioning of a completed divestment. 
 
Note.  Adapted from “Restructuring Strategies and Post-Bankruptcy Performance,” by 
Naujoks, M., 2012, Doctorate, University of Munich.   
 
 
As revealed in this literature review, there are no large sample quantitative studies 
specific to air carrier restructuring.  This section of the literature search connects generic 
restructuring strategies with air carrier specific metrics.  Restructuring actions during 
bankruptcy and the post-bankruptcy phases will be classified using the same constructs as  
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Lai and Sudarsanam (1997), Robbins and Pearce (1992) and Arogyaswamy, Barker, and 
Yasai-Ardekani (1995), Naujoks, (2012), and Eichner (2010).  Table 5 depicts the 
variables used in research to measure the restructuring actions proposed by Lai and 
Sudarsanam (1997). 
 
Operational.  “Operational restructuring comprises substantial changes to 
operational resources, organization and processes, as well as policies” (Eichner, 2010, 
p.53).  Operational changes include improvements to efficiency and productivity.  These 
areas will be reviewed to include air carrier specific metrics.  
 
Revenue. Hofer (1980) proposed revenue generation as one of four operating 
restructuring strategies, and its importance has been shown in a number of studies (Table 
5).  In the studies presented, revenue is either measured directly from the income 
statement or counted as an employed strategy when a press announcement of new 
products occurs.   
A revenue and efficiency metric commonly used in air transportation analysis is 
revenue per available ton mile (RATM) (O’Konner, 2001) and is available from the U.S. 
Department of Transportation.  Revenue per available ton mile is an air carrier metric for 
the amount of revenue generated per ton mile flown.  Measuring the change in RATM is 
a proxy for revenue increasing strategies.  In a study of airline success, McCabe (1998) 
found that if revenues are not maximized, every other strategy must be accomplished  
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Table 5.  Restructuring Strategy Metrics from Selected Studies. 
 
 
    
Hofer 
(1980) 
Robbins 
& Pearce 
(1992) 
Arogyaswa
-my, et al. 
(1995) 
Lai & 
Sudarsanam 
(1997) 
Eichner 
(2010) 
Naujoks 
(2012) 
Operational       
 Revenue increase      
 
Expense decrease (cost 
retrenchment) 
   
 

 
Announcement of 
product innovation or 
new products 
  
 

 
 
Restructuring 
announcement to 
include cost reductions 
  
 

 
 
Announcement of plant 
closure 
    
 
 
Announcement of 
personnel layoffs     

 
 Personnel reduction      
 
Increase in revenue per 
FTE 
  
 

 
 
Asset productivity 
measured by sales per 
assets 
   
 
 
 
 
Asset investment 
measured by CAPEX    

 

Financial       
 
Debt reduction by 
measurement of 
leverage ratio      

 
Announcement of DIP 
financing      

 
Announcement of debt 
restructuring 
 
 
 
 
 Total debt       
 
Announcement of debt-
to-equity swap 
  
 

 
 
Working capital 
increase 
  
 

 
 
Announcement of 
equity issuance    

 

  Dividend cut        
Managerial       
  
Announcement of 
change of CEO or 
Chairman 
     
Portfolio       
 
Announcement of 
acquisition or 
divestment 
     
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Hofer 
(1980) 
Robbins 
& Pearce 
(1992) 
Arogyaswa
-my, et al. 
(1995) 
Lai & 
Sudarsanam 
(1997) 
Eichner 
(2010) 
Naujoks 
(2012) 
 
 
     
 
Total assets (asset 
retrenchment) 
     
  
Fixed assets (PP&E 
net) 
  
  

  
 
very well if an airline is to be successful.  RATM will be considered as an air carrier 
specific variable for a revenue increasing strategy. 
 
Expense.  Expense reducing strategies are common to all studies.  Most 
researchers measure expense directly from the income sheet.  In addition to measuring 
expense reduction, Eichner (2010) considered whether a formal restructuring 
announcement was made that included cost cutting.  Eichner (2010) and Lai and 
Sudarsanam (1997) also considered whether an announcement of plant closure occurred. 
The cost for transporting people or goods can be measured by cost per available 
ton mile (CATM) (O’Konner, 2001).  Robbins and Pearce (1992) propose that firms must 
strongly reduce costs during the turnaround process.  In addition to revenue 
maximization, McCabe (1998) also found that competitive costs are necessary for airline 
success.  CATM will be considered as an air carrier specific variable for a cost decreasing 
strategy. 
 
Efficiency and Productivity.  In the studies presented (Table 5), labor efficiency 
and asset efficiency metrics were used.  Robbins and Pearce (1992) and Arogyaswamy, 
Barker, and Yasai-Ardekani (1995) found that reducing the number of employees is 
necessary to increase efficiency.  Schefczyk (1993) argues that productivity alone does 
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not reflect overall airline performance, but high operational performance is a key factor in 
high profitability.  The number of employees will be included as a metric similar to Lai 
and Sudarsanam (1997), Arogyaswamy, Barker, and Yasai-Ardekani (1995), and 
Naujoks (2012).  Investigating whether an announcement of layoffs was made, like 
Eichner (2010), is unnecessary since it is self evident by measuring employee headcount. 
In addition to measuring change in the number of personnel, productivity can be 
measured by examining the number of available ton miles (ATMs) produced per 
employee.  ATMs are a measure of airline output or product; the more ATMs produced 
per employee, the more productive and efficient the air carrier.  This is similar to Liedtka 
(1999) who measured total departures and hours flown per employee. 
An additional metric commonly used in the air carrier industry is load factor.  
Load factor, calculated as revenue ton miles divided by available ton miles, is a 
percentage of the total aircraft capacity carrying revenue.  Once an aircraft departs with 
empty capacity, the product has expired and provides no further revenue for the airline.  
McCabe (1998) found that managing load factor is one of the factors that airlines must 
accomplish well to be successful.  Load factor is an air carrier specific measure of 
productivity and efficiency. 
Liedtka (1999) measured labor and asset efficiency by calculating ASM per 
employee, miles per employee, departures per employee, passenger load factor, hours 
flown per aircraft, and miles flown per aircraft.  Gudmundsson (1999) made similar 
measurements in an international study of airline failure prediction.  These additional 
efficiency and productivity metrics will be included for study. 
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 Capital Expenditures.  Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) as opposed to operational 
expenses are used to acquire or improve productive assets, such as aircraft, that will 
generate revenue in future periods.  CAPEX investment can vary depending on a number 
of factors including economic outlook or available cash flow.  Robbins and Pearce (1992) 
find CAPEX reduction can be a short-term strategy for improving short-term cash flow.  
Naujoks (2012), however, found that reducing capital expenditures during Chapter 11 is 
negatively related to firm success.  CAPEX is not an air carrier specific measurement but 
will be included for study. 
 
Financial.  “Financial restructuring comprises significant and intentional changes 
to a firm’s capital structure or financing charges intended to either improve liquidity or to 
reduce its financial liability burden (Eichner, 2010, p. 54).”  Financial strategy metrics 
include: leverage, equity issuance, dividend reduction, and DIP financing. 
 
Leverage.  As discussed above, higher financial leverage can cause a firm to be 
forced to react early to financial distress and avoid breaking debt covenants; yet, it is high 
leverage that can cause a firm to become initially distressed.  Naujoks (2012) found that 
reducing the leverage ratio during post-bankruptcy is positively related to firm success.  
Altman (1978) published that higher equity financing (less leverage) is correlated with a 
firm becoming solvent.  Leverage can be measured by various ratios; for this study, 
leverage will be calculated as debt to total assets (Kieso, 2007).  Some studies track 
whether an announcement is made of debt restructuring.  For this study, such an 
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announcement is unnecessary, as it will be evident through the leverage ratio, total debt, 
or working capital ratio. 
Total debt and working capital are measured directly from the balance sheet.  
Changes to the total will represent financial restructuring.  Working capital, calculated as 
current assets less current liabilities, is the net amount of a company’s liquid resources 
available to meet financial demands of the operating cycle (Kieso, 2007). 
 
Equity Issuance. Leverage can be reduced by paying off debt or by issuing 
equity, thus reducing the leverage ratio.  Issuing equity by attracting investors can be 
difficult if a firm is struggling.  Naujoks (2012) found that equity investment usually 
occurs shortly before or after emerging from bankruptcy.  Issuing equity is a cash inflow 
to the firm and could be interpreted as a positive outlook by investors.  Eichner (2010) 
found no substantial relationship between equity issuance and post-bankruptcy success.  
Equity issuance will not be included in this study due to lack of applicability.  
Equity financing includes the sale of stocks or bonds to the public (Wensveen, 2011).  In 
order to attract funds, air carriers must be at least as strong as competing industries 
(Wensveen, 2011).  Equity financing is usually only available to financially strong air 
carriers and, as such, is very unlikely to be an option for financially stressed carriers in 
bankruptcy.  Wensveen (2011) clarifies further that most air carrier investments are debt 
financed. 
 
Dividend Cut.  While two of the studies presented, Lai and Sudarsanam (1997) 
and Eichner (2010), track dividend cuts, they will not be included in this study for the 
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same reason as equity issuance.  In recent years, dividend payouts to shareholders have 
been rare because of the cyclical nature of the industry (Vasigh, Taleghani, & Jenkins, 
2012).  Air carriers entering bankruptcy protection already lack sufficient cash flow and 
are not likely to have been making dividend payouts.  Naujoks (2012) also excluded this 
metric because it is not applicable. 
 
Debtor-in-possession Financing.  The announcement of DIP lending has been 
shown in studies to incite a positive stock market reaction.  Additionally, studies have 
shown that acquiring DIP financing has a positive correlation with the success of the 
reorganization (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006).  DIP financing has also been shown to be 
associated with shorter reorganization periods and time in bankruptcy (Altman & 
Hotchkiss, 2006).  DIP financing is approved when its value is proven to the bankruptcy 
court (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006) and can allow a firm to take advantage of 
opportunities that are not possible due to the inability to attract equity investment or 
unsecured debt (Johnson & Stulz, 1985).  Naujoks (2012) reported a positive relationship 
between DIP financing and firm success. 
 In addition to DIP financing, some air carriers have received financing due to the 
U.S. government providing a loan guarantee.  Congress introduced the Air Transportation 
Safety and System Stabilization Act on September 22, 2001, in an attempt to stabilize and 
restore confidence in the airline industry after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
(Morrell, 2007).  The Act established a board comprised of representatives from the 
General Accounting Office and Federal Reserve to implement and oversee compensation 
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and loan guarantees (Morrell, 2007).  Air carriers that suffered losses as a result of the 
attacks received compensation; $4.6 billion was paid to 427 carriers (Morrell, 2007). 
 The board offered guarantees on loans of up to $10 billion.  Airlines with 
approved loans had to abide by strict covenants including a satisfactory debt ratio, fixed 
charge coverage ratio, and adequate liquidity (Morrell, 2007).  A $900 million loan 
guarantee was made to US Airways as part of the exit financing for its first bankruptcy in 
2003 and was continued during the second bankruptcy in 2005 (Smith, 2006).  The US 
Airways loan guarantee was the only one approved as part of exit financing for an air 
carrier.  In the case of US Airways, the loan guarantees is similar to DIP financing as it 
was approved only after the board judged that US Airways was a going concern before 
providing the guarantee. 
 
Managerial.  “Managerial restructuring comprises intentional changes to the 
firm’s top management (Eichner, 2010, p.53).”  The result of executive replacement is 
not conclusive.  Sudarsanamam & Lai (2001) and Smith & Graves (2005) find no support 
for replacing upper management during restructuring while Hotchkiss (1995) found that 
retaining pre-bankruptcy management was strongly related to worse post-bankruptcy 
performance.  
Hotchkiss (1995) found that the current bankruptcy process is full of 
inefficiencies because incumbent management retains control and proposes the 
reorganization plan.  In her study, she found that retaining pre-bankruptcy management 
was strongly related to worse post-bankruptcy performance, and that firms often fail to 
meet cash flow projection (Hotchkiss, 1995).  Management can only be forced to resign 
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by a court trustee in cases of fraud or gross mismanagement (Hotchkiss, 1993).  LoPucki 
(1993) found in a study of large public bankruptcy cases that two patterns were 
consistent, one being that management is usually replaced.  In a study of restructuring 
strategies, Kamel (2005) found that the most common initial strategy in the turnaround 
process was finding new top management.  Bogan and Sandler’s (2012) research 
concluded that the strongest contributor to post-bankruptcy survival was the replacement 
of management.  Eichner (2010) and Naujoks (2012) measured managerial replacement 
through review of press filings and company reports.  In line with many turnaround 
studies, this research will also study whether management replacement affects 
performance. 
 
Portfolio.  “Portfolio restructuring comprises any substantial change to the firm’s 
asset portfolio through disposal or purchase of fixed assets or majority investments” 
(Eichner, 2010, p. 53).  During the retrenchment stage, divestments are used to generate 
cash and eliminate unprofitable business segments (Naujoks, 2012).  Robbins and Pearce 
(1992) and Eichner (2010) find a positive relationship between divestments and 
turnaround success.  However, if a core business is divested during bankruptcy Hotchkiss 
(1993) found a negative effect on post-bankruptcy success.  Ciliberto and Schenone 
(2010) found that bankrupt airlines permanently downsized their route structure, routes 
decreased by 25%, and markets decreased by 24%.  Lawton, Rajwani, and O’Kane 
(2011) found in their case study research that Aeroflot, Air Canada, and All Nippon 
Airlines simplified routes and fleet during the turnaround from poor performance.  
36 
 
Gudmundsson found that airlines operating many types of aircraft were more prone to 
distress. 
Eichner (2012) found an insignificant relationship between business acquisitions 
and turnaround probability.  Yet Sudaarsanam and Lai’s (2001) results show that firms 
recovering successfully focus on investment and acquisitions.  Airlines have used the 
opportunity of bankruptcy to expand their route structure while the automatic stay 
provision of bankruptcy allows airlines to forgo payment of most current expenses 
(Dowdell, 2006).  Lawton, Rajwani, and O’Kane (2011) reported that during the 
successful turnarounds of L ́ınea Aeropostal Santiago-Arica and TAM Linhas Ae ́reas, 
airline management extended and expanded market share.  In the recent bankruptcy of 
American Airlines, the merge with US Airways was included as a portion of the 
reorganization strategy (Corridore, 2013).  
As in previous studies (Table 5), total assets and fixed assets are measured to 
capture acquisitions and divestments.  Similar to Lawton, Rajwani, and O’Kane (2011), 
fleet size will be analyzed as an air carrier specific metric to determine whether air 
carriers reduce the number of aircraft as part of asset restructuring.   
 
Bankruptcy Performance Metrics.  The success of the turnaround can be 
defined by accounting metrics of profitability, relative performance to industry, meeting 
cash flow projections, stock performance, or whether or not the firm files for bankruptcy 
again (Hotchkiss, 1993) (Table 6).  Bankruptcy turnarounds can be considered successful 
by a number of additional measures, such as whether or not the reorganization plan was 
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approved, whether the same assets and same core operating business remain (LoPucki & 
Whitford, 1993), or if the firm reorganizes rather than liquidates (Eckbo, 2008). 
 
Table 6.  Performance Metrics of Selected Studies. 
Researcher Performance Metric 
Naujoks (2012) Free cash flow 
Eichner (2010) Interest coverage 
Jory and Madura (2010) Stock price performance 
Jostarndt and Sautner (2010) Interest coverage 
Lemmon, Ma, and Tashjian (2009) EBITDA 
Jostarndt and Sautner (2008) Interest coverage 
Denis and Rodgers (2007) 
Operating income before depreciation 
scaled by total assets 
Kalay, Singhal, and Tashjian (2007) EBITDA scaled by total assets 
Buschmann (2006) Return on investment 
Dawley, Hoffman, and Brockman (2003) Return on assets 
Kahl (2001) EBITD scaled by assets or sales 
Alderson and Betker (1999) 
Net cash flows and EBITDA scaled by 
sales 
Eberhart, Altman, and Aggarwal (1999) Stock price performance 
Maksimovic and Philllips (1998) 
Plant-level productivity and operating cash 
flows 
Lai and Sudarsanam (1997) Stock price performance 
Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) Operating income 
Hotchkiss (1995) Operating income 
Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) Interest coverage 
Ofek (1993) Stock price performance 
  
Airline Specific   
Goll and Rasheed (2011) 
Operating profit per operating revenue, 
return on assets, profit per RPM 
Wang (2009) Operating profit per operating revenue 
Tsikriktsis (2007) Operating profit per operating revenue 
Gittell et al. (2006) Stock price performance 
Goll and Rasheed (2006) Operating profit per operating revenue 
Chen (1994) Operating profit per operating revenue 
 
Note.  Adapted from “Restructuring Strategies and Post-Bankruptcy Performance”, by 
Naujoks, M., 2012, Doctorate, University of Munich. 
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Airline financial condition has historically been studied by liquidity, leverage, 
activity/turnover, and profitability ratios (Gritta, Adrangi, Davalos, & Bright, 2008).  
Researchers have combined these ratios to produce a score to measure financial distress 
and bankruptcy (Gritta, Adrangi, Davalos, & Bright, 2008).  Bankruptcy failure 
prediction models are used by management to assess and monitor the progress of a 
turnaround (Gudmundsson, 2002).  Gudmundsson (2002) describes further that failure  
prediction models are used by creditors to assess creditworthiness and by investors to 
assess the risk of insolvency.  
In 1968, Altman published seminal research in the area of bankruptcy forecasting.  
Using 22 ratios from balance sheet and income statement data, Altman selected five that 
were most predictive of corporate bankruptcy to create the Altman Z-Score Model.  Since 
Altman’s (1968) publication, a number of Altman-like models have been developed 
(Pilarski & Dinh, 1999) such as the Taffler Z-Score and Pilarski P-Score.  Agarwal and 
Taffler (2007) summarize that Z-Scores generate emotion and the response that they do 
not work because of a misunderstanding of what they are designed to do.  “Strictly 
speaking, what a Z-Score model asks is does this firm have a financial profile more 
similar to the failed group of firms from which the model was developed or the solvent 
set?” (Agarwal & Taffler, 2007).   
A number of researchers have used predictive failure models to measure whether 
firms emerging from bankruptcy have a financial profile similar to failed firms or 
successful firms.  Gudmundsson (2002) mentions that failure prediction models have 
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been used extensively by the financial industry as an early warning for business stress, 
and management uses these models to assess turnaround performance.   
 Altman, Kant, and Rattanaruengyot (2009) used the modified Altman Z-Score as 
a measurement of post-bankruptcy success based on the logic that the model has proven 
to be credible at predicting corporate distress and may be appropriate for measuring a 
second bankruptcy filing.  Altman et al. (2009) found that the companies filing a second 
bankruptcy petition had significantly worse Z-Scores after emerging from bankruptcy 
than companies that remained going concerns.  Altman et al. (2009) summarized by 
stating,  
We believe that a credible corporate distress prediction model can be an important 
indicator of the future success of firms emerging from bankruptcy and could even 
be used as an independent technique by the bankruptcy court to assess the future 
viability of the reorganization plan, which, as the Bankruptcy Code stipulates, 
should be done.  (p. 16)   
Gritta, Jurinski, and Reed (n.d.) state that the Altman Z-Score model can be used by an 
analyst or court judge/witness during bankruptcy to forecast the effect of strategies for 
reorganizing the distressed entity. 
In Altman, Kant, and Rattanaruengyot’s (2009) article researching post-Chapter 
11 bankruptcy performance, they used the modified Altman’s Z”-Score model to track 
post-bankruptcy performance.  They describes Altman’s work as extending “the 
applicability of bankruptcy prediction to a unique assessment of the health of corporate 
industrial entities as they emerge from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process and [assess] 
the likelihood that the debtor will have to file for bankruptcy again…” (Altman et al., 
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2009, p.2).  Altman et al. (2009) justifies selection of the Z-Score model as a post-
bankruptcy indicator because it has been “proven to be credible and accepted by 
academics and practitioners for predicting corporate distress” and it could be “effective in 
assessing the future health of firms emerging from bankruptcy reorganization, especially 
if the result you are trying to predict (avoid) is a second filing of bankruptcy” (Altman et 
al., 2009, p. 10).  The results of Altman et al. (2009) showed that firms that experience a 
second filing of bankruptcy had a significantly worse financial profile as measured by the 
Z-Score than those firms that emerged and continued in that condition. 
Lucarelli (2003) notes that the Altman Z-Score model has also been used by 
turnaround professionals to measure progress.  Additionally, he summarizes that, 
“following a plan that improves the Z-Score helps validate the turnaround plan by 
providing management with a tool it can understand, buy into, and follow” (Lucarelli, 
2003, p. 10).  Altman and La Fleur (1981) describe how the Altman Z-Score was actively 
used to manage the financial turnaround of GTI Corporation.  The management strategy 
formulated and implemented by Jim La Fleur (Altman & La Fleur, 1981) proposed and 
implemented strategies which decreased the ratios and caused the Z-Score to decrease, 
reducing the risk of bankruptcy.  The authors concluded that the GTI Corporate 
turnaround proved how predictive models could be used as management tools for 
implementing a business turnaround and encouraged managers to review predictive 
models related to their company’s operations.  Altman and Hotchkiss (2006) summarize, 
“In addition to the prescriptive use of a financial model in turnaround strategy, we 
advocate the Z-Score model’s use as a type of barometer to any restructuring” (p.306). 
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The shortcoming of the Altman Z-Score model for this study is that it is not 
specific to air carriers.  However, an Altman-like model called Pilarski’s P-Score is an air 
carrier specific bankruptcy model created by Pilarski and Dinh (1999).  As air carrier 
specific bankruptcy research is less prominent than combined industry research, so is the 
use of the P-Score.  Pilarski and Dinh (1999) used logistic regression to create the P-
Score model for airline financial distress; the probability of bankruptcy is calculated by 
Equations 1 and 2. 
 
   (1) 
 
Where: 
X1 = operating revenues/total assets 
X2 = retained earnings/total assets 
X3 = equity/total debt obligations  
X4 = liquid assets/current maturities of total debt obligations 
X5 = earnings before interest and taxes/operating revenues 
The P-Score (P) is determined by Equation 2: 
 
        (2) 
 
The P-Score is the probability of bankruptcy; the higher the P value, the greater 
the financial stress and chance of failure.  Goodfriend, Gritta, Adrangi, and Davalos 
(2004) found through a comparative study that the P-Score and Altman’s modified Z”-
  
W = -1.98X1 - 4.95X2 -1.96X3 -0.14X4 - 2.38X5
  
P =1 / 1+ e-W( )
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Score are correlated.  Pilarski and Dinh (1999) developed the econometric model by 
including the best predictors from financial ratios and specific airline variables.  Data for 
analysis came from air carriers between 1981 and 1997, where Pilarski and Dinh (1999) 
were able to use 36 bankruptcies for analysis.  The P-Score value is logistically 
distributed so the probabilities will tend toward 1 (bankrupt) or 0 (non-bankrupt).   
Variables X1, X2, and X3 are the same as Altman’s Z-Score, while the remaining two are 
very similar.  The median time from prediction of bankruptcy to the actual event is three 
and a half quarters (Pilarski & Dinh, 1999).  A favorable attribute of the P-Score model is 
that it includes many operating characteristics of an air carrier: asset productivity, capital 
adequacy, leverage, liquidity, and profitability (Pilarski & Dinh, 1999). 
 
Summary 
This literature review introduced air carrier history, operations during the 
regulated era, and the effects of deregulation.  The air carrier industry is described 
through the empty core problem, and characteristics of successful and unsuccessful air 
carriers are presented.  A number of studies indicate operational performance is linked to 
air carrier profitability, and that leverage and profit metrics are crucial indicators of 
airline health.  Next, financial distress and the bankruptcy process are defined to include 
terms such as debtor-in-possession financing and renegotiation of labor contracts.   
The definitions of turnarounds and success metrics are discussed, and 
restructuring strategy literature is presented that covers non-bankruptcy turnarounds.  
Often the first step during the turnaround process is retrenchment, where costs are 
reduced throughout the firm.  Most restructuring strategies discovered during cross-
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industry studies have addressed four areas: operational, financial, managerial, and 
portfolio/asset restructuring.  These restructuring actions are compared to the stakeholder 
preferences of owners, lenders, and management due to competing interests while a firm 
is in survival mode. 
Bankruptcy turnaround literature is presented along with the few airline 
reorganization studies.  The most specific airline turnaround case study found that profit 
maximization, service quality, leadership replacement, and staff development are the 
most critical factors for air carrier reorientation.  Chapter 11 bankruptcy is portrayed as a 
competitive strategy where an airline can renegotiate labor contracts, renegotiate long-
term leases, and default on aircraft lease payments to reduce and modernize the fleet.  
Lastly, restructuring strategies are discussed with air carrier specific metrics. 
The proposed research involves a number of literature areas: airline industry, 
financial distress, airline crisis response, restructuring strategies, reorganization, and 
post-bankruptcy performance.  Airline literature thoroughly addresses pre-bankruptcy 
and financial distress within the industry, yet lacks relevant research in the areas of 
restructuring strategies, reorganization, and post-bankruptcy performance.  While studies 
have been conducted on post-bankruptcy topics, they are broad and include many 
industries.   
Through this literature search, the air carrier specific metric, P-Score, was 
identified as a measurement of air carrier distress.  Existing literature also classifies 
restructuring strategies into four groups: operational, financial, managerial, and asset 
restructuring.  Specific air carrier research also identifies metrics available to measure the 
implementation of these strategies.   
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Research Goal 
The purpose of this study is to measure the effectiveness of operational, 
managerial, financial, and portfolio restructuring strategies on air carriers emerging from 
Chapter 11 by answering the following four research questions: 
RQ1: What is the relationship between operational restructuring on post-
bankruptcy performance during the post-bankruptcy period? 
RQ2: What is the relationship between financial restructuring on post-bankruptcy 
performance during the post-bankruptcy period? 
RQ3: What is the relationship between managerial restructuring on post-
bankruptcy performance during the post-bankruptcy period?  
RQ4: What is the relationship between portfolio restructuring on post-bankruptcy 
performance during the post-bankruptcy period? 
As discussed in the literature review, most of the turnaround literature is cross-
industry with very little specific to the air carrier industry.  This study aims to fill the 
large literature gap in the area of air carrier post-bankruptcy performance by investigating 
the impact of the four restructuring strategies during bankruptcy and the post-bankruptcy 
period.   
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Approach 
This research is a longitudinal study of existing data submitted by air carriers to 
the U.S. Department of Transportation that have filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and then 
emerged from bankruptcy protection.  The literature review identified variables to 
measure each restructuring area.  A multilevel factor analysis was conducted to explore 
underlying factors in air carrier restructuring actions.  The air carrier metrics were 
regressed in a two-level multilevel growth model to investigate the individual differences 
between air carriers over three years following emergence from bankruptcy. 
Pandit (2000) found that although there has been over two decades of 
restructuring strategy research, literature is very incomplete due to two issues: problems 
with research design and ad hoc investigation.  The issue with ad hoc research is “…that 
they have either proceeded without a priori theoretical guidance or have failed to relate 
findings to extant theory ex post” (Pandit, 2000, p. 31).  This study avoids both issues by 
performing quantitative analysis with guidance from prior theory.  
Restructuring strategies and post-bankruptcy performance were measured by 
modifying the theoretical restructuring models of Robbins and Pearce (1992) and 
Arogyaswamy, Barker, and Yasai-Ardekani (1995) as Naujoks (2012) did for 
bankruptcy, along with restructuring strategies from Lai and Sudarsanam (1997) and 
Eichner (2012).  Pandit (2000) argues that profitability alone is not appropriate for 
measuring strategy effectiveness because it may lag.  To avoid the problem with only 
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measuring profitability, the present study used an airline stress indicator, P-Score, created 
by Pilarski and Dinh (1999) for measuring air carrier bankruptcy probability. 
This research is similar to Eichner (2012) and Naujoks (2012) and builds upon 
Pettigrew’s (1990) recommended model for strategic management research and strategic 
change.  Pettigrew’s explanation of strategic change is built upon content, process, and 
context.  Content in the present study were the effects of time and the four restructuring 
strategies presented by Lai and Sudarsanam (1997): operational, financial, portfolio, and 
managerial restructuring.  Analyzing restructuring strategies occurred during the period 
from an air carrier declaring bankruptcy until three years after exiting.  The context in 
which this restructuring occurs included both internal and external factors that were 
controlled for in this study.   
 
 Time.  This study measured quarterly data for the period when the bankruptcy 
filing was made, and the next measurement occurred when the air carrier emerged from 
bankruptcy.  Similar to previous literature, quarterly measurements were made for three 
years after the air carrier emerged from bankruptcy.  The post-bankruptcy time period 
may differ between air carriers if the airline liquidated or merged with another carrier.  
Measuring time allowed for relationships to be discovered between strategy 
implementation and performance for each air carrier. 
 
Dependent Variable.  The dependent variable used for analysis was the P-Score.  
Previous studies (Table 6) have used a number of metrics to measure post-bankruptcy 
performance, such as accounting metrics of profitability, relative performance to 
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industry, meeting cash flow projections, stock performance, and whether or not the firm 
files for bankruptcy again (Hotchkiss, 1993).  For the current study, stock price 
performance was not considered due to the numerous external factors affecting price, and 
relative performance to industry was not applicable, as this study sought to measure 
internal performance after declaring bankruptcy.  In some cases, an air carrier emerging 
from bankruptcy is out performing many air carriers in the industry which enter 
bankruptcy but never emerge (GAO, 2005).  To measure post-bankruptcy performance, a 
metric that measures specific conditions of an air carrier was necessary. 
Pandit (2000) explained that the most complete method to measure a firm’s 
performance is with more than one metric.  Pandit (2000) noted that current turnaround 
research is inadequate when only profitability is used to define success; multiple 
measurements are more complete.  Pandit (2000) explained that the condition of a firm 
and profitability are not perfectly correlated; the firm’s condition can continue to decline 
while profitability may remain constant and then suddenly decrease substantially.  
Including measurements in addition to profitability can also provide a more accurate 
perspective if management is intentionally manipulating earnings.   
As described in Chapter II, models have been developed to measure financial 
stress within a firm.  These models, such as Altman’s Z-Score and Pilarski’s P-Score, 
measure performance with more than one metric; metrics may include asset productivity, 
capital adequacy, leverage, liquidity, and profitability (Pilarski & Dinh, 1999).  As 
discussed in the literature review, these types of financial stress models have been used to 
measure firm performance, pre-bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy.  While the Altman Z-
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Score model could be used as the dependent variable for the present study, the most 
appropriate measurement is the air carrier specific metric, Pilarski’s P-Score (1999). 
The P-Score was appropriate for this study as the dependent variable because it is 
specific to air carriers with a prediction rate of 85.1%.  Additionally, the P-Score is a 
measure of five characteristics of the air carrier rather than just profitability.  The P-Score 
model has also been used by the U.S. Department of Transportation to track air carrier 
financial strength (Gritta, Adrangi, Davalos, & Bright, 2008). 
In the present study, P-Score is calculated on a quarterly basis for each airline and 
allowed for comparability between air carriers because it was not affected by accounting 
differences of owning versus leasing of aircraft.  To calculate the P-Score, each variable 
was weighted to calculate W (Equation 1); next, the logarithmic function of W (Equation 
2) yielded the P-Score.  Pilarski and Dinh (1999) transform W for the simplicity of 
making the P-Score value fall between 0 and 1.  In the present study, the W variable is 
referred to as the W-Score (WSCR), and was used as the dependent variable without 
transforming the value into the P-Score.  By not transforming W, the value is more easily 
interpreted for analysis comparability, and is less skewed.  
 
Independent variables.  The independent variables of this study are listed in 
Table 7.  These air carrier specific variables were generated through the literature search 
and described in Chapter II.  The following section clarifies the calculations of each 
independent variable.  Data used for the financial and operating statistic calculations were 
retrieved from Form 41 data.  The Form 41 reports are described by the U.S. Department  
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Table 7.  Independent Variables. 
    
Air Carrier 
Specific Metric 
Variable Variable 
Type 
Variable 
Scale 
Operational     
 Revenue RATM RATM Continuous Ratio 
 
Expense (cost 
retrenchment) CATM CATM Continuous 
 
Ratio 
 Personnel FTE FTE Continuous Ratio 
 Asset investment CAPEX CAPEX Continuous Ratio 
 
Efficiency and 
productivity 
ATM/FTE AFTE Continuous Ratio 
 Load factor LF Continuous Ratio 
 Miles/FTE MFTE Continuous Ratio 
 Departures/FTE DFTE Continuous Ratio 
 
Hours 
flown/aircraft HACFT Continuous Ratio 
 Miles/aircraft MACFT Continuous Ratio 
  ATM/aircraft AACFT Continuous Ratio 
Financial     
 
Debt reduction by 
measurement of 
leverage ratio Debt/Equity DE Continuous 
 
 
Ratio 
 
Announcement of DIP 
financing Press statement DIP Discrete 
 
Nominal 
 
Amount of DIP 
financing Press statement DIPC Continuous Ratio 
 Total debt Debt DEBT Continuous Ratio 
 
Working capital 
increase CA less CL 
 
WC Continuous Ratio 
Managerial     
  
Announcement of 
change of CEO or 
Chairman Press statement CEO Discrete Nominal 
Portfolio     
 
Total assets (asset 
retrenchment) Assets ASTS Continuous Ratio 
 
Fixed assets (PP&E 
net) 
Fleet Size FLEET Continuous Ratio 
  
Non-current 
assets NCA Continuous Ratio 
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of Transportation Research and Innovative Technology Administration (DOT RITA) 
(2013) as: 
The statistics collected on the financial forms submitted monthly, quarterly, 
semiannually, and annually to BTS by each large certificated air carrier subject to 
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.  The four classes of financial and operating 
statistics collected on individual schedules of the Form 41 Report are grouped as 
follows: (A) Certification, (B) Balance Sheet Elements, (P) Profit and Loss 
Elements, and (T) Traffic and Capacity Elements. 
 
Operational.  Revenue per available ton mile (RATM) was calculated by 
dividing Operating revenues by Available ton miles.  Operating revenues are defined by 
the U.S. DOT RITA (2013) as: 
Revenues from the performance of air transportation and related incidental 
services.  Includes (1) transport revenue from the carriage of all classes of traffic 
in scheduled and nonscheduled services, and (2) nontransport revenues consisting 
of Federal subsidy (where applicable) and revenues for services related to air 
transportation (Glossary).   
Available ton miles are defined as “The aircraft miles flown on each flight stage 
multiplied by the available capacity on the aircraft in tons.” (U.S. DOT RITA, 2013). 
 Cost per available ton mile (CATM) was calculated by dividing Operating 
expense by Available ton miles.  Operating expenses are defined as, “Expenses incurred 
in the performance of air transportation, based on overall operating revenues and overall 
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operating expenses.  Does not include nonoperating income and expenses, nonrecurring 
items, or income tax” (U.S. DOT RITA, 2013, Glossary). 
 Calculations using the number of employees, Full-time equivalent employees, are 
defined as: 
The number of full-time equivalent employees equals the number of employees 
on full-time schedules plus the number of employees on part-time schedules 
converted to a full-time basis.  Two part-time employees are counted as one full-
time employee.  An airline's number of full-time equivalent employees will be 
less than the number of its total employees unless it has no part-time employees 
(U.S. DOT RITA, 2013, Glossary). 
Monthly full-time equivalent (FTE) data are only available from 1990 to present.  
Prior to 1990, airlines reported annual headcount data as full-time or part-time 
employees.  For comparative FTE calculations for airlines reporting prior to 1990, part-
time employees were considered to equal half of a FTE.  Due to lack of monthly or 
quarterly reporting, prior to 1990, the annual calculated FTE value was also used for the 
previous three quarters.  This method was only necessary for FTE data from Braniff 
Airways and Continental Airlines first bankruptcy. 
 Capital expenditures (CAPEX) are reported in financial statements on the cash 
flow statement.  Form 41 submissions only require air carriers to report income statement 
and balance sheet information.  As the cash flow statement is created from the income 
statement and balance sheet, capital expenditures can be calculated by Equation 3 (Bragg, 
2012):  
 
  𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 = 𝑁𝐸𝑊𝑃𝑃𝐸 − 𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐸 + 𝐷𝐸𝑃
    (3) 
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Where: 
CAPEX = Capital Expenditures 
NEWPPE = Current period property, plant, and equipment from balance sheet 
OLDPPE = Previous period property, plant and equipment from balance sheet  
DEP = Depreciation reported in current period from income statement 
 
 Load factor was calculated by dividing revenue ton miles (RTM) by available ton 
miles (ATM).  Ton miles are defined as “One ton (2,000 pounds) transported one statue 
mile.  Ton-miles are computed by multiplying the aircraft miles flown on each inter-
airport segment by the number of tons carried on that segment” (U.S. DOT RITA, 2013, 
Glossary).  “Revenue ton-miles are computed by multiplying the revenue aircraft miles 
flown on each flight stage by the number of tons transported on that stage” (U.S. ECFR, 
2014).  Load factor was calculated in this manner to be consistent between passenger 
carrying air carriers and cargo carrying air carriers.  RTM and ATM are reported by the 
DOT by both passenger and cargo air carriers.  Passengers are converted to ton miles by 
considering each passenger as 200 pounds (U.S. ECFR, 2014). 
 The remaining efficiency and productivity calculations that required Miles, 
Departures, and Hours were found in the Form 41 reports.  A revenue Mile is defined as: 
“A statute mile (5,280 feet).  All mileage computations are based on statute miles” (U.S. 
DOT RITA, 2013, Glossary).  A revenue Departure is defined as “A takeoff made at an 
airport” (U.S. DOT RITA, 2013, Glossary).  A revenue Hour is defined as an airborne 
aircraft hour (U.S. DOT RITA, 2013, Glossary).    
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 The number of aircraft operated by each air carrier is also available from U.S. 
DOT RITA (2013) in Form 41 data.  This information is only available annually after 
1992.  The reported number of aircraft operated for the year ending was also used for the 
prior three quarters.  Prior to 1992, aircraft fleet information was retrieved from press 
statements and air carrier published documents. 
 
Financial.  The leverage ratio was calculated by dividing total debt by total 
equity.  Both values were taken from the balance sheets supplied through Form 41 
submissions.  Working capital was calculated by the Form 41 values of current assets less 
current liabilities (Kieso, 2007).   
Announcement of DIP financing was determined by searching the LexisNexis 
Database for press releases and public financial filings containing the keywords: DIP 
financing, debtor in possession financing, and bankruptcy financing.  The use of DIP 
financing was coded as a dichotomous variable for multilevel modeling (MLM) where 
one indicates use of DIP financing, and zero indicates no DIP financing.  The amount of 
DIP financing was found on the same press releases to create the continuous DIP variable 
for the exploratory factor analysis. 
 
Managerial.  The replacement of the CEO was determined through a 
combination of air carrier annual reports, air carrier history obtained from the company 
website, or through a search of the LexisNexis database.  The database was searched over 
the period of bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy for the words CEO or Chief Executive 
Officer to identify press releases discussing CEO replacement.  The replacement of the 
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CEO was coded as a dichotomous variable where one indicates replacement of the CEO 
during bankruptcy or the subsequent three years, and zero indicates no CEO replacement. 
 
Portfolio.  Total assets were retrieved from financial statement balance sheets.  
Non-current assets are calculated by subtracting current assets from total assets.  Fleet 
size information was retrieved as described above in the Operational section. 
 
Control variables.  The following control variables considered to normalize 
airline performance were tested during model creation and included if appropriate: gross 
domestic product, jet fuel price, number of air carriers operating, and total industry 
revenue.  Due to the cyclical nature of airlines and their dependency on general economic 
conditions, gross domestic product was tested to control for the external environment, 
similar to Guzhva and Pagiavlas (2004).  Jet fuel was tested as a control due to extreme 
variability in price.  The number of air carriers operating was included to control for 
competitiveness and total industry revenue was included to account for economic 
conditions within the air carrier industry. 
The control variables selected for testing were included based on being used in 
previous air carrier studies: Gross domestic product, Lai (1997); Fuel price, Goll & 
Rasheed (2011); Total industry revenue, Goll & Rasheed (2011), Hotchkiss (1993).  
While there are many variables that could be considered for analysis, too many variables 
can over-fit the model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  For parsimony, three control 
variables were included and tested for predictability along with the independent variables.  
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Due to methodological constraints, thorough analysis was conducted before any variables 
were included in the final model.  
 
Multilevel Exploratory Factor Analysis.  Exploratory factor analysis was 
conducted prior to multilevel modeling to further understand whether the four 
restructuring areas proposed in the literature also describe air carrier restructuring 
metrics.  Factor analysis on the air carrier independent variables may reveal that the four 
restructuring areas of operational, financial, managerial, and portfolio exist in the air 
carrier data or there may be other latent factors specific to air carriers.  The resulting 
factors were not used as an input to the multilevel model, but this exploration further adds 
to air carrier restructuring literature. 
Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, and Strahan (1999) suggest including at least 
four measured variables for each of the expected factors in the data to improve accuracy 
of the results.  As a result of this guidance, CEO, the only variable measuring managerial 
restructuring, was not included in the factor analysis.  When reporting results, managerial 
restructuring was considered a separate restructuring strategy that exists in addition to the 
factors discovered through the exploratory analysis.  
The assumption of normality was also tested for while performing descriptive 
statistics.  Additional guidance from Linda Muthen, co-developer of MPlus statistical 
software, regarding data in this study was also followed, “You should not do a log 
transformation of the variables.  This changes the correlations among the variables.  You 
should divide them by a constant.  This does not change the correlations among the 
variables” (personal communication, March 31, 2014).  To determine how many factors 
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to include in the model, a combination of a scree test, eigenvalues, and descriptive fit 
indices were reviewed.  As suggested by Fabrigar, et al. (1999), oblique rotation was used 
to perform the factor analysis.  Oblique rotation allows for the factors to be correlated 
while orthogonal assumes no correlation.  As suggested by Muthen (2010), when 
factoring with non-normal data, maximum likelihood estimation is used for the multilevel 
exploratory factor analysis (MEFA). 
The data in the present study has a hierarchical structure because repeated 
measures are made on each air carrier.  An assumption of factor analysis is that 
observations are independent (Field, 2009).  This assumption is not upheld with the data 
collected in this study.  Historically, researchers have dealt with the issue via two 
approaches (Reise, Ventura, Nuechterlein, & Kim, 2005).  Some researchers select one 
observation at random from each study participant.  While this method meets the 
assumption of independence, it severely reduces the sample size and therefore is not 
appropriate for the present study.  The other option chosen by some researchers is to 
ignore the hierarchical structure of data and treat all observations as independent (Reise, 
et al., 2005).  While the second approach uses all of the data, the parameter estimated 
standard errors and model fit statistics may be inaccurate (Reise, et al., 2005). 
A more recent method developed for avoiding these problems is multilevel factor 
analysis (MFA).  Initially, MFA was proposed as a four step process by Muthen (1994).  
These four steps for exploratory factor analysis are:  
First, conduct an ordinary exploratory factor analysis of the total correlation 
matrix.  This “incorrect” analysis is based on treating all the observations as 
independent.  The objective of the first step is to obtain a rough sense of the 
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underlying factor structure.  The second step is to estimate the ICC (interclass 
correlation) for each item.  This step establishes whether an MFA is necessary.  
The third and fourth steps, respectively, are to estimate a within-correlations and 
between correlation matrix and conduct factor analysis for each matrix separately. 
(Reise, et al., 2005, p. 130) 
Factor analysis also assumes that variables are continuous with an interval or ratio 
scale (Field, 2009).  This study has two dichotomous variables, DIP and CEO.  As 
discussed above, CEO was removed for the factor analysis.  DIP was converted to a 
continuous variable for the exploratory factor analysis by measuring the amount of DIP 
financing received by each air carrier.  While Field (2009) states that factor analysis can 
occur with dichotomous variables if the correlation matrix is constructed from tetrachoric 
correlation coefficients, all variables in this study are continuous to simplify factor 
analysis results.  SPSS 18 (2014) software was used for data preparation and descriptive 
statistics; Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2012) software was chosen for the exploratory 
MFA because it performs the analysis in a single step.   
 
Selection of Statistical Methodology.  The objective of this research is to find 
any existing relationships between air carrier performance measured by the P-Score and 
strategies employed after bankruptcy.  This research question requires longitudinal 
regression to link the independent variables, or strategies, to the dependent variable, W-
Score.   
 Multiple regression and ANOVAs are inadequate for addressing this type of 
research question.  According to Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), using multiple regression 
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for analyzing change over time will result in smaller standard errors, but is usually not 
appropriate because the repeated measurements of individuals violates the assumption of 
independence of observations.  In this study, air carriers were measured quarterly from a 
period of three years after emerging from bankruptcy making multiple regression 
improper. 
 Analysis using ANOVA is also not appropriate because it would require many 
variables to analyze clusters.  Including many variables will reduce power especially 
since the data set is relatively small.  ANOVAs also require that a complete case or cross-
section be removed if any data are missing.  Additionally, ANOVA is only used for a 
comparison test and does not test the impact of independent variables on a dependent 
variable. 
 As described later regarding sample size, the lack of large air carriers emerging 
from bankruptcy also limits the statistical methods available.  Designing a study where 
the data are split into successful and unsuccessful air carriers is not appropriate due to the 
relatively small number of air carriers.  As such, multiple discriminate analysis and 
logistic regression, two common methodologies used in related studies, are not used due 
to this limitation. 
 Multilevel modeling is a methodology appropriate for analyzing data that have 
been measured repeatedly on an individual and, thus, is used in this study.  Hierarchical 
or multilevel models allow for analysis of time-series and cross-sectional data (Tan, 
2008).  Additional benefits of multilevel models include not adhering to the assumption 
of homogeneity of regression slopes and not being limited by missing data (Field, 2009).  
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The ability of MLM to accommodate data that are inappropriate for other statistical 
methods takes full advantage of all air carrier data available. 
Singer and Willett (2003) state that there are three criteria for conducting MLM: 
(a) three or more waves of data, (b) a method of measuring time, and (c) a method of 
measuring the dependent variable.  The more waves of data measured allow for more 
statistical models.  The fewer the waves of data, the simpler the model has to be, and 
growth is often assumed to be linear.     
Singer and Willett (2003) state that time must be measured reliably and validly so 
that change can be detected over time.  While equally spaced time measurements are 
appealing, it is not required for MLM.  Individuals are not required to be measured on an 
identical schedule nor must each individual have the same number of waves.  In this 
study, the air carriers are measured on the same schedule, but not all have 13 waves of 
data.  The last criterion states that the dependent variable must change systematically 
over time, and the validity and precision of the metric must be preserved.  This 
systematic change over time was tested during preliminary analyses.  All three criteria are 
met, allowing for MLM. 
 
Multilevel Research Model 
 MLM is similar to ordinary least squares regression where an outcome variable is 
predicted by a linear combination of variables (Osborne, 2008).  In this study, there are 
two levels, the repeated measures of restructuring actions are denoted as first-level 
observations, and the air carriers are denoted as second-level observations.  The multiple 
observations on each air carrier are viewed as nested within the air carrier (Figure 2).  
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According to Raudenbush & Bryk (2002), when multiple observations are treated as 
nested, it allows the researcher to analyze, without difficulty, data where the number and 
spacing of measurements varies across subjects. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Multilevel structure. 
 
 
 
Multilevel modeling was used to answer the research questions.  The first level of 
analysis measures the within-individual change over time (Level – 1 submodel) 
(Equation 4) and the second level model identifies inter-individual differences in change 
(Level – 2 submodel) (Equation 5).  
    (4) 
Where: 
Yij = dependent variable 
0i  = intercept of the true change trajectory for individual i in the population 
1i  = slope of the true change trajectory for individual i in the population  
Xij  = independent variable 
ij  = random measurement error 

Yij  0i 1iXij  ij
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i  = individual air carrier 
j= time period 
    (5) 
Where: 
0i  = intercept of the true change trajectory for individual i in the population 
1i  = slope of the true change trajectory for individual i in the population  
00  = population average of the level-1 intercepts, 0i , for individuals with a level-
2 predictor value of 0. 
10  = population average of the level-1 slopes, 1i , for individuals with a level-2 
predictor value of 0. 
u0j  = deviation of the cluster mean from the overall mean 
u1j  = deviation of the cluster slope from the overall slope 
i  = individual airline 
j = time period 
 
Writing Equations 4 and 5 more specifically to this study and including all 
predictor variables yields Equations 6 (Level - 1) and 7 (Level - 2).  The final model will 
only include significant predictors. 
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Where: 
Yij = dependent variable 
0i  = intercept of the true change trajectory for individual i in the population 
xi  = slope of the true change trajectory for individual i in the population for x 
independent variable 
ij  = random measurement error 
i  = individual air carrier 
j = time period 
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Where: 
0i  = intercept of the true change trajectory for individual i in the population 
xi  = slope of the true change trajectory for individual i in the population for x 
independent variable 
00  = population average of the level-1 intercepts, 0i , for individuals with a level-
2 predictor value of 0 
x0  = population average of the level-1 slopes, 1i , for individuals with a level-2 
predictor value of 0 for x independent variable 
u0j  = deviation of the cluster mean from the overall mean 
uxj  = deviation of the cluster slope from the overall slope for x independent 
variable 
i  = individual airline 
j = time period 
 
After data exploration, the basic model was built.  The first two simple models 
constructed were an unconditional means model and an unconditional growth model.  
Unconditional models partition and quantify the outcome variation across people without 
regard to time and across people and time (Singer & Willett, 2003).  These initial results 
establish whether there is a systematic variation in the outcome worth exploring (Singer 
& Willett, 2003). 
The final process includes building the multilevel model by starting with a basic 
model where all parameters are fixed and then adding random coefficients as appropriate 
and exploring confounding variables (Singer & Willett, 2003).  Predictors were entered, 
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retained, and removed based on a combination of logic, theory, and prior research, 
supplemented by judicious hypothesis testing and comparison of model fit.  The subset of 
models presented are an unconditional means model, an unconditional growth model, and 
the final model.  SPSS 18 (2014) software was used for descriptive statistics, data 
preparation, and multilevel modeling. 
This study has a number of strengths due to its design.  The use of MLM allows 
for an air carrier to be measured for restructuring actions over time rather than at just one 
point in time.  As described in the next section, the air carriers used are the entire 
population with data available.  Also, the use of the W-Score for the dependent variable 
is a further strength as it measures air carrier performance by multiple characteristics. 
 
Population/Sample 
The population selected for this study includes all large U.S. air carriers that have 
emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy since 1979.  Large U.S. air carriers are defined by 
the U.S. Department of Transportation (2013) as operating aircraft over 60 seats or with a 
payload greater than 18,000 pounds.  The collection of longitudinal data using all air 
carrier data available for the study creates no sampling issues with the associated data as 
experienced in other studies with this design (Goll & Rasheed, 2011).  Data collected for 
the identified air carriers was measured quarterly.  Air carriers that have emerged from 
bankruptcy where data are available are shown in Table 8. 
Upon review of the population of 40 airlines that emerged from Chapter 11, 25 
were large air carriers.  These 25 air carriers were the complete population of large U.S. 
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air carriers that emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Rather than a sample, this analysis 
used the entire population. 
 
Table 8.  Large air carriers that have emerged from bankruptcy. 
Date Filed Year Air Carrier Chapter 
Date 
Emerged 
Duration 
(days) 
01/05/10 2010 Mesa Air  11 01/20/11 380 
10/06/08 2008 Sun Country 11 02/01/11 848 
04/11/08 2008 Frontier Airlines  11 10/01/09 538 
10/13/05 2005 Mesaba Airlines  11 04/24/07 558 
09/14/05 2005 Delta Air Lines 11 04/25/07 563 
09/14/05 2005 Northwest Airlines 11 05/18/07 611 
09/14/05 2005 Comair 11   
12/30/04 2004 Aloha Airlines 11 02/17/06 414 
10/26/04 2004 ATA Airlines 11 02/28/06 490 
09/12/04 2004 US Airways 11 09/27/05 375 
01/30/04 2004 
Atlas Air/Polar Air 
Cargo 11 07/01/04 153 
03/21/03 2003 Hawaiian Airlines 11 06/02/05 791 
12/09/02 2002 United Airlines 11 02/02/06 1513 
08/11/02 2002 US Airways 11 03/31/03 230 
01/02/02 2002 Sun Country Airlines 7 04/15/02 97 
12/13/00 2000 Allegiant Air* 11 03/01/02 443 
05/01/00 2000 Kitty Hawk 11 08/05/02 826 
06/30/95 1995 Trans World Airlines 11 08/24/95 54 
09/21/93 1993 Hawaiian Airlines 11 09/12/94 351 
06/08/92 1992 Markair 11 05/04/94 686 
01/31/92 1992 Trans World Airlines 11 11/03/93 633 
06/27/91 1991 America West Airlines 11 08/25/94 1138 
12/03/90 1990 Continental Airlines 11 04/27/93 854 
09/24/83 1983 Continental Airlines 11 09/02/86 1074 
05/13/82 1982 Braniff International 11 09/01/83 476 
*Classified as a commuter air carrier during a portion of restructuring period 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Sources of the Data 
Data available for analysis are available primarily through DOT Form 41 
submissions by air carriers.  These submissions include balance sheet and income 
statement financial data.  Operating metrics such as passengers carried and miles flown 
are also available from the DOT.  Twenty-five air carriers were identified that emerged 
from bankruptcy between 1979 and 2013 where quarterly financial and operational data 
are available.  Additionally, fleet count and employee headcount is available from the 
DOT.  Management changes, and DIP financing were collected by searching the 
LexisNexis database for published news articles containing keywords such as debtor-in-
possession financing, DIP financing, post-petition financing, bankruptcy, and CEO, 
similar to Naujoks (2012). 
All air carriers studied submitted financial and operational Form 41 data to the 
U.S. Department of Transportation.  Data was collected manually from archival sources: 
 U.S. Security Exchange Commission (annual reports) 
 Airlines for America (air carrier bankruptcy list) 
 U.S. Department of Transportation (Form 41 data) 
 U.S. Department of Commerce (gross domestic product) 
 U.S. Energy Information Administration (jet fuel price) 
 Company website (annual reports) 
 LexisNexis (press release) 
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Treatment of the Data 
Multilevel models are an extension of regression, and all of the assumptions of 
regression apply (Field, 2009).  However, the assumptions of independence and 
independent errors were not required because the purpose of a multilevel model is to 
handle the lack of independence between multiple measurements on the same air carrier 
(Field, 2009).  As such, the following assumptions specified by Field (2009) were 
checked and discussed in Chapter IV: 
 Variable types: The predictor variable is quantitative or categorical, and 
the predictor variables are quantitative and continuous (Assumption met) 
 Non-zero variance: Indicates that the predictors should have a variance 
other than zero (Figure G2) 
 No perfect multicollinearity: Correlation between predictors should be less 
than 0.80 (Table A1) 
 Homoscedasticity: Variance of the residuals should be constant (Figures 9 
and G2) 
 Normally distributed errors: Errors are normally distributed with a mean 
of zero (Figures 10 and G1) 
Singer and Willett (2003) also advise checking the functional form of the outcome 
variable versus the predictors by using plots at level 1 and 2.  This is to verify that the 
data fits the assumed model (i.e., linear, quadratic, cubic).  Singer and Willett (2003) 
suggest checking normality and homoscedasticity by visually inspecting plots of the 
residual distributions and the raw residuals against predictors.  In this study, numerous 
models were developed to identify the final models.  Instead of checking assumptions for 
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each model, Singer and Willett (2003) suggest that assumptions be examined for several 
initial models and all final models. 
As instructed by Singer and Willett (2003), data were arranged in a person-period 
format.  Person in this study refers to an individual air carrier.  Prior to model 
specification, a visual inspection of growth plots was performed on P-Score versus time.  
At this point, the model was specified as linear or curve linear, smooth or jagged, and 
continuous or disjoint.  Singer and Willett (2003) recommend erring on the side of 
parsimony and postulate a simple linear model during model construction.   
 Preliminary analysis was also conducted on each independent variable.  Plots 
were created for each to observe intercepts and slopes.  As recommended by Singer and 
Willett (2003), bivariate plots and sample correlations were conducted to identify 
multicollinearity.  Outliers were identified and removed or corrected if they were 
determined to be a keystroke error.  The time-invariant predictors were centered around 
their grand means so the parameter estimates change very little with the inclusion of 
additional predictors (Singer & Willett, 2003). 
 
Descriptive Statistics.  Descriptive analysis includes an empirical growth plot to 
evaluate change in absolute and relative terms, and each trajectory was plotted to 
summarize each air carrier’s W-Score.  The trajectories were plotted both 
nonparametrically and through a parametric approach using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression.  Even though OLS regression assumes independence and homoscedasticity 
and these unlikely hold for the residuals, the estimates are useful for exploration analysis 
(Singer & Willett, 2003).  After exploring the within-individual differences, the inter-
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individual differences were reviewed by plotting the entire set of smoothed individual 
trajectories with a nonparametric smoother and OLS regression. 
 
Power.  As defined by Field (2009), power is the ability to determine whether an 
effect exists in the population.  To determine power in multilevel models, the following 
factors must be considered: sample size, significance level, study design, interclass 
correlation, number of groups, and number of cases per group (Field, 2009).  In general, 
there should be more than 20 groups at the highest-level variable (Field, 2009).  This 
study meets the recommendation with 25 groups at the highest level. 
The covariance structure is a starting point for the computer software to begin 
estimating the model parameters (Field, 2009).  Repeated measures studies often use a 
first-order autoregressive structure (Field, 2009); the present study does the same.  Other 
structures such as unstructured, compound symmetric, heterogeneous compound 
symmetric, heterogeneous autoregressive, and Toeplitz were also tested and excluded 
based on deviance statistics. 
 
Validity Assessment 
Cross-Validation.  To validate the model, K-fold cross-validation was conducted.  
This method is useful especially when data are sparse because the entire dataset is used 
for testing (Hastie, T., Tibshirani, R., & Friedman, J. H., 2009).  To conduct this method, 
the data are randomly split into K roughly sized parts.  When K equals 5, the data are split 
into 5 parts.  First the model is trained on K-1 parts of the data and then tested on the 
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remaining data.  The training and testing process is conducted K times where each part is 
used as the validation data set.   
Five or ten-fold cross validation is recommended by Breiman and Spector (1992) 
and Kohavi (1995).  For this study, K will equal 5 due to the computing time for creating 
each multilevel model and so that each section has an adequate amount of data.  The data 
in this study have a hierarchical structure and must be split at the highest level by air 
carrier.  The air carriers were randomly split into five parts for cross-validation.  The 
prediction error was calculated for each of the five models and then averaged to calculate 
the cross-validation prediction error as shown by (Afshartous, 1997) (Equation 8): 
 
C V yiy
^
i
ki 
 
 
 
 
 
i1
n

2
/n    (8) 
Where: 
CV = cross-validation prediction error 
yi  =  actual value from test data 

y
^
i
k i 
 = represents the predicted value for the observation i that is computed with 
the k(i)th part of the data removed. 
n c = number of prediction errors calculated, in this case n equals K 
Guided by literature as described in Chapter IV, the model with the smallest predictive 
mean squared error (MSE) was selected as the final model.  The final model was then 
tested on the complete data set to calculate the MSE. 
This longitudinal study used archival data submitted to the U.S. DOT by large air 
carriers that have filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and then emerged from bankruptcy 
protection.  Air carrier performance was measured by the dependent variable, W-Score, 
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an air carrier financial distress metric.  A multilevel exploratory factor analysis was 
conducted to explore underlying factors in air carrier specific metrics.  A two-level 
multilevel growth model investigated the individual differences between air carriers 
emerging from bankruptcy over a period of three years.  Results from the multilevel 
exploratory factor analysis and multilevel model are discussed in the following section. 
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CHAPTER IV  
RESULTS 
Quarterly data from 25 U.S. air carriers were collected for the three-year period 
after emerging from bankruptcy.  Multilevel exploratory factor analysis (MEFA) was 
conducted to explore the underlying factor structure of the air carrier measurements and 
multilevel modeling (MLM) was used to identify the significant strategic actions 
affecting post-bankruptcy performance as measured by the untransformed P-Score, 
WSCR. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics with outliers removed for each variable are shown in Table 
9.  Appendix A presents correlations between all variables with correlations greater than 
0.80 shaded.  This multicollinearity was avoided by the selection of variables for the 
MEFA and MLM.  Variables selected for the MEFA and MLM were first determined by 
a review of correlations.  The decision of which highly correlated variable to retain was 
made based on removing the variable that was highly correlated with multiple variables 
or was partially measured in another variable.  For example, miles per aircraft (MAC) 
and hours per aircraft (HAC) are highly correlated, MAC was not included because 
similar information is measured in the retained variable, available ton miles per aircraft 
(AAC).  Continuing this example, when developing the multilevel models, if HAC was 
found to not be a significant predictor, then HAC was removed and MAC was tested.  
This process with the MLM can be seen in Table E.  In data preparation for MLM, all 
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variables were centered on their grand mean and some variables were transformed 
through log transformation to address skewness as discussed in Chapter III.   
  
 
Table 9.  Descriptive Statistics. 
 
 N % Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
AAC 284 87% 376,866.3 72,633,432.0 9,755,222.8 11,765,643.6 
AFTE 294 90% 9,773.3 1,463,488.4 140,261.2 246,305.1 
ASTS 287 88% 4,620.5 33,273,098.0 4,574,169.3 8,045,947.8 
CAPX 291 90% -1,113,641.0 974,622.0 29,341.6 178,622.3 
CATM 292 90% 0.0 2.6 0.8 0.4 
CEO 292 90% 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 
CGDP 317 98% 3,331.3 16,667.9 11,568.0 3,546.3 
CJF 317 98% 0.4 3.9 1.6 1.0 
CNOC 299 92% 45.0 125.0 108.7 16.1 
CTIR 299 92% 9,237,888.0 51,526,880.0 34,252,627.6 11,030,705.9 
DE 282 87% -217.7 157.8 3.7 29.9 
DEBT 287 88% 2,941.8 28,109,681.0 4,135,901.4 7,181,894.0 
DFTE 296 91% 1.6 22.5 6.2 4.3 
DIP 291 90% 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.5 
DIPC 270 83% 0.0 2,000.0 284.6 610.6 
FLET 284 87% 3.0 742.0 144.1 153.7 
FTE 299 92% 45.0 76,954.0 13,483.2 16,382.4 
HAC 284 87% 139.1 4,105.7 791.3 524.9 
LF 297 91% 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.1 
MAC 284 87% 59,991.4 1,981,921.9 347,918.2 245,300.9 
MFTE 296 91% 1,069.3 14,697.5 4,693.5 2,451.7 
NCA 287 88% -1,960.0 26,923,705.0 3,475,252.4 6,286,400.0 
RATM 292 90% 0.0 2.4 0.7 0.4 
WC 288 89% -3,415,404.0 879,676.0 -311,488.7 615,615.9 
WSCR 288 89% -13.5 19.5 -2.6 2.8 
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WSCR.  Values of the dependent variable are shown in Figure 3.  The average 
value of WSCR is -2.6 with a standard deviation of 2.8 (Table 9).  The regression line in 
Figure 3 shows a slight decrease over TIME indicating that the average probability of 
bankruptcy decreases after emerging from bankruptcy.  Each air carrier’s WSCR is 
depicted separately in Appendix C.  Table A shows that WSCR is not highly correlated 
(greater than 0.80) with any other variable and causing a multicollinearity problem.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  WSCR per quarter with regression line. 
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Missing Data  
The percentage of missing data per variable is shown in Table 9.  No variable has 
the total number of observations of 325 because some air carriers were not available for 
the complete three year post-bankruptcy period.  Air carrier specific missing data is 
shown in Table 10.  During MEFA, MPlus used all available data in Table 9 for analysis.  
By default, SPSS uses list wise deletion when conducting MLM and did not use all data 
described in Table 9.  This deletion removed two air carriers from analysis: Atlas Air 
(ATL) and Trans World Airline’s first bankruptcy (TWA1).  ATL was excluded from 
MLM because of missing all values of available ton miles per employee (AFTE), which 
were removed when correcting for outliers.  SPSS deleted TWA1 during MLM because 
of missing the number of aircraft per quarter for all periods.  The number of cases 
excluded for each MLM dataset is shown in Table B1; other specific air carrier data 
collection issues are noted in Table B2. 
 
Outliers 
 Histograms were used to identify erroneous outliers.  The extreme and erroneous 
values in Table 11 were removed before analysis.  Field (2009) recommends removing 
outliers with a z-score value greater than 3.29.  The z-score values for each of the 
removed outliers are also presented in Table 11. 
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Table 10.  Air Carrier Missing Data. 
 
Air Carrier 
Air 
Carrier 
ID 
Qtrs. of Data 
Available 
(max. 13) Reason  
Allegiant Air ALLG 13 100% No missing data 
Aloha Airlines ALOH 10 77% Liquidated 
ATA Airlines ATA  7 54% Filed Chapter 11 
Atlas Air/Polar Air 
Cargo ATL  13 100% No missing data 
America West Airlines AWA  13 100% No missing data 
Braniff International BRAN 13 100% No missing data 
Comair COM  13 100% No missing data 
Continental Airlines 1 CON1 13 100% No missing data 
Continental Airlines 2 CON2 13 100% No missing data 
Delta Air Lines DELT 13 100% No missing data 
Frontier Airlines  FRON 13 100% No missing data 
Hawaiian Airlines 1 HAW1 13 100% No missing data 
Hawaiian Airlines 2 HAW2 13 100% No missing data 
Kitty Hawk KITT 13 100% No missing data 
Markair MARK 6 46% Liquidated 
Mesa Air  MESA 10 77% Data unavailable at time of study 
Mesaba Airlines  MESB 13 100% No missing data 
Northwest Airlines NWA  12 92% Merged with Delta 
Sun Country 1 SUN1 13 100% No missing data 
Sun Country Airlines 2 SUN2 10 77% Data unavailable at time of study 
Trans World Airlines 1 TWA1 8 62% Filed Chapter 11 
Trans World Airlines 2 TWA2 13 100% No missing data 
United Airlines UNIT 13 100% No missing data 
US Airways 1 USA1 8 62% Filed Chapter 11 
US Airways 2 USA2 13 100% No missing data 
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Table 11.  Outliers Removed. 
 
Variable Value 
Air 
Carrier Period 
Z-
Score Reason for removal 
CAPEX 8,069,967 DELT 12 45.0 
Extreme value; Delta/NWA merger 
values combined for one period 
DE 2,816 MESA 7 94.2 
Extreme value; period equity 
inconsistent with surrounding 
periods 
DE -606 USA1 6 20.4 
Extreme value compared to other 
periods 
DE -600 MESA 8 20.2 
Extreme value; period equity 
inconsistent with surrounding 
periods 
DE -385 USA2 1 13.0 
Extreme value; first period after 
bankruptcy, very inconsistent with 
subsequent 
DE -285 DELT 12 9.7 
Extreme value; Delta/NWA merger 
values combined for one period 
DEBT 44,173,320 DELT 12 5.6 
Extreme value; Delta/NWA merger 
values combined for one period 
ASTS 44,018,556 DELT 12 4.9 
Extreme value; Delta/NWA merger 
values combined for one period 
NCA 35,000,000 DELT 12 5.0 
Extreme value; Delta/NWA merger 
values combined for one period 
AFTE 1.07-1.46 ATL 1-12 
4.3-
6.0 
Extreme values of cargo air carrier 
ATL are not similar with all other 
air carriers 
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Multilevel Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 MEFA was conducted with MPlus using maximum likelihood estimation and 
oblique rotation.  The variables included in the MEFA were selected based on 
correlations; variables, load factor (LF), and departures per employees (DFTE) were 
removed due to negative residual variances causing no convergence in the model.  The 
interclass correlations (ICCs) for each variable are shown in Table 12.  The ICCs 
measure the proportion of variance at the air carrier level or the individual level.  ICCs 
close to zero indicate that the majority of the variation is within each air carrier.  ICCs 
close to one indicate the majority of the variance is between each air carrier. 
 
Table 12. Interclass Correlations. 
Variable ICC 
CATM 0.74 
AAC 0.85 
WC 0.64 
MFTE 0.78 
CAPX 0.10 
DE 0.06 
DIPC 0.88 
HAC 0.79 
DEBT 0.99 
FLET 0.97 
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Figure 4.  Scree plot. 
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The scree plot at the within level is shown in Figure 4.  The scree plots show the 
number and strength of factors present in the analysis.  The inflection point on the scree 
plot for the within level indicates three or four factors.  A model was also run where the 
factor structure was unrestricted at the between level.  An unrestricted model at the 
between level assumes perfect fit and enhances the process of identifying a sufficient 
number of factors at the within level (Muthen & Asparouhov, 2009). 
Multilevel exploratory factor analysis was conducted with three and four factors 
at the within level and one factor (representing each air carrier) at the between level.  
Only one factor was used at the between level because this study was only using 
variables specific to the within level.  Tables 13 (restricted) and 14 (unrestricted) depict 
the factor loadings for the three and four factor rotations.  The unrestricted model 
corroborates the restricted model with the same significant variables found in each factor. 
 
Table 13. Factor Structure – 3 and 4 Within Factors and 1 Between Factor. 
  Three Factor Rotation Four Factor Rotation 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 4 
CATM 0.963 -0.070 -0.031 -0.089 -0.156 -0.049 -0.050 
CAPX 0.029 -0.029 0.144 -0.036 0.002 0.181 -0.052 
HAC -0.094 1.375 -0.081 0.985 0.121 -0.104 -0.013 
AAC -0.075 0.624 -0.132 0.872 0.056 -0.117 0.060 
DE -0.072 -0.001 -0.157 0.005 0.012 -0.073 0.199 
DEBT 0.020 0.000 0.529 0.029 -0.017 0.416 -0.324 
WC -0.046 0.007 -0.221 0.073 0.027 -0.006 0.627 
DIPC 0.069 0.028 -0.465 0.005 0.017 -0.258 0.313 
FLET -0.039 -0.085 0.519 -0.153 -0.011 0.975 -0.041 
MFTE -0.346 0.201 -0.072 0.204 2.130 -0.025 0.086 
Factor loading greater than |.30| are shaded 
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Table 14. Factor Structure – 3 and 4 Within Factors and Unrestricted Between. 
  Three Factor Rotation Four Factor Rotation 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 4 
CATM 0.986 -0.072 -0.025 -0.137 -0.091 -0.047 -0.049 
CAPX 0.035 -0.030 0.141 0.001 -0.040 0.170 -0.059 
HAC -0.094 1.376 -0.080 0.107 0.993 -0.105 -0.009 
AAC -0.075 0.622 -0.133 0.050 0.863 -0.118 0.063 
DE -0.068 0.001 -0.181 0.010 0.009 -0.097 0.210 
DEBT 0.019 0.000 0.528 -0.015 0.027 0.415 -0.322 
WC -0.041 0.007 -0.234 0.023 0.069 -0.008 0.644 
DIPC 0.066 0.027 -0.464 0.016 0.004 -0.252 0.316 
FLET -0.038 -0.084 0.514 -0.011 -0.152 0.984 -0.047 
MFTE -0.337 0.202 -0.075 2.412 0.206 -0.025 0.085 
Factor loading greater than |.30| are shaded 
 
Fit statistics for the two models, restricted and unrestricted, are shown in Table 
15.  As summarized by Rosenberg and Cizek (2009), adequate fit is indicated by Chi-
square p < .05, Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) ≥ 0.95, Root 
Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA) ≤ 0.06, and Standardized Root Mean 
Squared Residual (SRMR) ≤ 0.08.  With the exception of the Chi-Square Test and the 
TLI, the three and four factor models fit well.  Based on the fit statistics, the four factor 
model fits slightly better.  The adequacy of the four factor model at the within level is 
further verified with the unrestricted model showing a very good fit with all tests. 
The MEFA factors are summarized in Table 16.  The three factor model shows 
three factors in the areas of efficiency (financial and employee), aircraft utilization, and 
balance sheet metrics.  The four factor model identified factors in the areas of aircraft 
utilization, employee efficiency, and balance sheet metrics. 
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Table 15.  Fit Statistics. 
Within 
Level 
Factors 
Between 
Level 
Factors 
Chi-Square 
Test CFI TLI RMSEA 
SRMR 
(within) 
SRMR 
(between) 
3 1 89.879* (53) 0.939 0.896 0.048 0.039 0.192 
3 UN 21.732 (18) 0.994 0.969 0.000 0.039 0.000 
4 1 73.184* (46) 0.955 0.911 0.045 0.018 0.191 
4 UN 4.599 (11) 1.000 1.087 0.000 0.017 0.000 
* p < .05; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root 
Mean Squared Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Squared 
Residual; UN = Unrestricted 
 
The four factor model was identified as the most appropriate model due to better 
fit statistics.  The results from the MEFA did not influence variable selection for the 
MLM.  However, results from the MEFA further strengthen existing literature that 
supports the existence of four restructuring areas and use for developing a regression 
model.  
 
Table 16. Underlying Factors. 
Restructuring 
Areas Factors 3-Factor 4-Factor 
Operational 
Efficiency 
CATM   
MFTE MFTE 
Aircraft Utilization 
HAC HAC 
AAC AAC 
Portfolio/ 
Financial 
Balance Sheet 
DEBT DEBT 
FLET FLET 
DIPC   
Financial 
Financing and 
Liquidity 
  DIPC 
 WC 
  DEBT 
 
 
 
83 
 
Multilevel Model 
 
MLM was conducted on the air carrier data using SPSS software.  Air carriers 
were first randomly assigned to a training dataset.  Next, multilevel models were 
developed for each of the five datasets by including significant predictors.  Over 200 
models were fit to the data to test each predictor and identify five final models for each 
training data set.  The five models were then cross-validated on test data and resulted in 
Model FL3 as the model of best fit. 
 
Air Carrier Random Assignment.  To perform 5-fold cross validation, air 
carriers were randomly assigned to five groups (Table 17).  This random assignment 
created five training sets of data: L1, L2, L3, L4, and L5 (Table 18).  The sample size for 
each data set is shown in Table B1. 
 
Table 17.  Air Carrier Random Folds and Training Sets. 
Air Carrier Random Folds 
1 2 3 4 5 
AWA  ALLG FRON ATL  ALOH 
DELT ATA  HAW1 CON1 COM  
HAW2 BRAN SUN2 MESB CON2 
KITT MARK TWA2 UNIT MESA 
SUN1 NWA  USA2 USA1 TWA1 
 
Table 18.  Training and Testing Datasets. 
Training 
Data Set 
Training 
Folds 
Testing 
Fold 
L1 2,3,4,5 1 
L2 1,3,4,5 2 
L3 1,2,4,5 3 
L4 1,2,3,5 4 
L5 1,2,3,4 5 
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Need for a Multilevel Model.  To assess the need for a multilevel model, an 
empirical growth plot of W-Score over time for each air carrier was examined (Figures 3 
and 5).  The Figure 5 plot indicates that each air carrier’s W-Score starts at different 
values and changes at different rates over time.  Some plots show a large decrease 
initially while others stay relatively flat.  Figure 3 is a scatter plot of WSCR with a 
regression line included.  This regression line of best fit indicates a gradual negative 
slope over time.  The decrease in WSCR represents a slight improvement overall in air 
carrier financial stress during the restructuring period.  Singer and Willett (2003) also 
recommend visually inspecting individual growth trajectories to determine if WSCR 
changes over time.   
Appendix C presents the varying initial values of WSCR and change over time by 
plotting each air carrier’s specific WSCR separately.  Some air carriers, such as ALOH 
and ATA, do not have values for the full three year period because of company 
liquidation.  Most carriers made changes that gradually affected WSCR.  However, 
ALLG, HAW1, and SUN1 implemented changes that had a large effect on WSCR.  Also 
apparent from viewing the plots is that most air carriers show a visible decrease between 
T=0 and T=1; the period between these measurements represents time spent under 
bankruptcy protection. 
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Figure 5.  Growth plot of WSCR per quarter after bankruptcy. 
 
 
 
 Unconditional Model.  Singer and Willett (2003) advise that the first model fit 
should be an unconditional means model where predictors are absent at every level. 
A first order autoregressive covariance structure was selected for the model in line with 
Field’s (2009) recommendation for repeated measures data.  This was confirmed as the 
correct choice by testing a variance component, a diagonal, and an unstructured 
covariance structure.  Both the variance component and diagonal structure models fit 
worse as indicated by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) values.  As described by Singer and Willett (2003), AIC and BIC values 
can be compared for any models as long as both are fit to the same set of data.  The 
model with the smaller AIC or BIC values fits better (Singer & Willett, 2003).  The 
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unstructured covariance structure model was not used because it did not converge and is 
not ideal for data with many time periods (Singer & Willett, 2003) as is the case with the 
present study. 
 Table 19 shows the five unconditional models for each training set of data.  
Model A for datasets L1 and L4 have an intraclass correlation (ICC) of zero, indicating 
no variability at level 2 between the air carriers.  Model A from data sets L2, L3, and L5 
have ICCs of 0.289, 0.183, and 0.190, respectively.  These ICC values indicate that 18 to 
29% of the variance in WSCR is due to differences (level 2) among air carriers, and level 
2 predictors could be used to further explain variation. 
  
  
 
Table 19.  Unconditional Models. 
    Data L1 Data L2 Data L3 Data L4 Data L5 
    Model A Model A Model A Model A Model A 
            
Intercept .548 (.460) -.187 (.405) .316 (.443) .282 (.283) .017 (.412) 
            
Variance 
Components           
 Level 1 (Within) 7.480*** (1.505) 5.875*** (.625) 8.709*** (1.415) 8.629*** (1.040) 7.787*** (1.364) 
 Level 1 rho 0.830*** (.036) .055 (.117) 0.374** (.124) 0.384*** (.090) 0.383** (.139) 
 
Level 2 
(Between) 
.000 (.000) 2.386* (.989) 1.948 (1.226) .000 (.000) 1.830 (1.128) 
 Level 2 rho (ICC) .000  .289  .183  .000  .190  
            
Deviance           
 AIC 755.088  1014.434  981.976  1041.462  1040.622  
  BIC 768.201   1027.860   995.109   1054.908   1054.086   
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p ≤ 0.001 **p ≤ 0.01 *p ≤ 0.05      
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 Unconditional Growth Model.  The unconditional growth model is the 
unconditional model with time. For clarity of presentation, only models from dataset L3 
are included within the text.  The unconditional growth models for the other four training 
data sets are shown in Appendix D.  The L3 data models were chosen for presentation 
because the L3 final model is most predictive.  Table 20 contains the unconditional 
growth models fitted three times with TIME, TIME2, and TIME3 for data set L3.  
Guidance from Field (2009) was followed to fit the linear, quadratic, and cubic function 
of time.  Quadratic time measures acceleration or deceleration in the rate of change of 
WSCR (Heck, Thomas, & Tabata, 2013).  The cubic function of time measures the 
increase or decrease in the acceleration or deceleration in the rate of change of WSCR. 
 For each model, with only linear TIME added, the predictor was significant.  All 
but data set L3 had a significant fit of both the linear and quadratic predictor of TIME.  
Only data set L2 had significant predictors of TIME, TIME2, and TIME3.  With a time 
predictor added, the ICC for each model indicated a variation at level 2 between air 
carriers.   
 Pseudo R2 values were calculated as guided by Singer and Willett (2003).  As 
predictors are added, Pseudo R2 values are used to measure the decrease in residual 
variance.  The goal of adding predictors to a model is to further explain variation; this is 
indicated by an increase in Pseudo R2.  For example, TIME in data set L3 (Table 20) 
explains 19% of the within-air carrier (level 1) variation of WSCR.  TIME and TIME2, 
explain 21% of the within-air carrier variation, and adding TIME3 explains an additional 
1% for a total of 22%. 
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 Following Singer and Willett (2003), Schwarz’s Bayesian criterion (BIC) and 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) were also used to evaluate model fit where smaller 
values indicate better fit.  Values of BIC and AIC can be compared when the same data 
set is used such as between models fit only to L1 but not used to compare models fit on 
L1 and L2.  AIC and BIC values on data sets L1 and L3 show a slight increase when 
TIME3 was added.  Linear TIME was selected as most appropriate due to model 
simplicity, as advised by Singer and Willett (2003), and because TIME2 and TIME3 do 
not substantially explain variance.  Linear time is also supported by review of Figure 6.  
After adding time variables to each model, additional predictors were examined by 
creating conditional growth models.  
 
 
Table 20.  Data L3 Unconditional Growth Models. 
 
    Model B Model C Model D 
Intercept  1.552 ** 2.202 *** 2.610 *** 
TIME  -.239 *** -.612 ** -1.163 ** 
TIME*TIME    .032  .156  
TIME*TIME*TIME      -.007  
Variance 
Components               
Level 1 (Within)  7.099 *** 6.922 *** 6.813 *** 
Level 1 rho  .192  .182  .170  
Level 2 (Between)  2.318 * 2.379 * 2.387 * 
Level 2 rho (ICC)   .246   .256   .259   
Pseudo R2   0.185   0.205   0.218   
Goodness-of-fit        
        
Deviance        
AIC  971.313  969.896  970.053  
BIC   987.729   989.595   993.036   
***p ≤ 0.001 **p ≤ 0.01 *p ≤ 0.05 
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Conditional Growth Models.  The next step in multilevel analysis is to add 
predictor variables to the unconditional growth models, creating conditional growth 
models.  Main effects of all predictor variables as described in Chapter III were added 
individually for each training data set.  As discussed in the Descriptive Statistics section, 
all variables were considered for the MLM regardless of the results from the MEFA.  The 
MEFA results support the existence of including variables to measure the four 
restructuring areas.  Variable selection and retention was based on multicollinearity and 
significance as a predictor.  Table E shows the process of adding and removing predictor 
variables to identify the final models of each data set.  The final models presented in 
Table 21 were selected by reviewing the effect of each predictor on previous predictors, 
variance components, pseudo R2, and deviance statistics as shown in Table E.  Total debt 
(DEBT) and total assets (ASTS) were significant in all models and CATM was 
significant in all but L1 data.  Pseudo R2 values were much higher in data from L2, L4, 
and L5, indicating that approximately 36% of the variance within each air carrier was 
explained.  Each model’s AIC and BIC values are included, but because each model was 
fit to a different dataset, the values are not comparable. As concluded by Singer and 
Willett (2003), “… no statistical model is ever final; it is simply a placeholder until a 
better model is found” (p.105).   
  
Table 21.  Conditional Growth Models. 
  Data L1 Data L2 Data L3 Data L4 Data L5 
  Model E Model E Model E Model E Model E 
Intercept .744 (.675) .428 (.529) 1.340* (.589) .801 (.404) .567 (.482) 
Time -.161 (.074) -.098* (.046) -0.169* (.069) -0.107 (.057) -0.120* (.057) 
CATM   1.938** (.682) 3.858*** (.804) 5.383*** (.737) 4.887*** (.783) 
LF 6.145** (2.205) 10.229** (3.810)       
CTIR       -.0001*** (.000) -.0001*** (.000) 
HACFT 13.883** (4.408)         
AACFT -6.853** (2.414)   4.876*** (1.429)   4.425*** (1.299) 
DEBT 26.885*** (3.461) 30.426*** (4.535) 23.113*** (5.449) 23.416*** (4.378) 22.965*** (5.513) 
ASTS -23.657*** (3.430) -30.052*** (4.451) -22.816*** (5.270) -22.010*** (4.219) -21.808*** (5.374) 
MACFT   8.883*** (1.983)       
MFTE   -.503** (.162)       
Variance Components          
Within 7.104* (3.475) 3.778*** (.455) 6.532*** (1.143) 5.429*** (.837) 4.985*** (.774) 
Level 1 
rho 0.879*** (.060) .155 (.164) .402** (.129) .331** (.130) .350** (.130) 
Between .451 (3.277) 3.085* (1.550) 2.270 (1.313) .206 (.502) 1.556 (.865) 
ICC .060  .450  .258  .037  .238  
Pseudo R2 .050  .357  .250  .371  .360  
Deviance           
AIC 703.570  938.691  935.064  965.126  966.355  
BIC 736.352   975.613   964.613   995.378   1000.015   
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p ≤ 0.001 **p ≤ 0.01 *p ≤ 0.05     
9
1
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Cross-validation 
 Based on the five final models (Table 21), Equations 9 through 13 were tested on 
the appropriate data sets as described in Table 18.  Table 22 shows the predictive mean 
squared error (MSE) for each data set. 
 
FL1 AR(1) 
)(66.23)(88.26)(85.6
)(88.13)(15.6)(16.074.0
i ji ji j
i ji ji ji j
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
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    (9) 
FL2 AR(1) 
)(05.30)(43.30)(88.8)(50.
)(23.10)(94.1)(10.043.0
i ji ji ji j
i ji ji ji j
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

  (10) 
FL3 AR(1) 
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
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   (11) 
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i ji ji ji j
ASTSDEBT
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
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)(0001.0)(89.4)(12.057.0
i ji ji j
i ji ji ji j
ASTSDEBTAACFT
CTIRCATMTIMEY


   (13) 
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Table 22.  Prediction Mean Squared Error. 
Data Set Prediction MSE 
L1 12.497 
L2 18.624 
L3 3.836 
L4 14.686 
L5 6.826 
 
 
 A review of the five final model’s significant predictors is compared in Table 23. 
Variables TIME, DEBT, and ASTS are included in all models.  LF was found to be 
significant in datasets FL1 and FL2.  Variables HAC and MAC, and variables AAC and 
MFTE are highly correlated.  CATM was significant in datasets FL2, FL3, and FL4.  The 
control variable CTIR was only found significant in two of the datasets, FL4 and FL5.  
 The best final model was selected with guidance from literature.  Hastie, 
Tibshirani, and Friedman, (2009) state that cross-validation is the most common method 
for estimating prediction error.  They suggest, “Often a “one-standard error” rule is used 
with cross-validation, in which we choose the most parsimonious model whose error is 
no more than one standard error above the error of the best model” (p.244).  Browne 
(2000) states that the purpose of cross-validation is “…to find a model that yields as 
small an overall discrepancy as is possible given a specific sample size” (p.130).  In a 
dissertation titled, Essays of Model Selection, Chen (2009) concludes that “the model 
with the smaller mean squared errors is chosen as the best model” (p.47).  Based on 
literature, the final model from the L3 data set was chosen as the best model.  Not only is 
the L3 model most predictive, but it also is one of the three most parsimonious models by 
containing only five predictors.  The final L3 model was then tested on the complete 
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dataset yielding an MSE of 7.340; this value was the second smallest of all five models 
tested on the complete dataset. 
 
 
Table 23. Significant Predictors. 
  FL1 FL2 FL3 FL4 FL5 
TIME     
DEBT     
ASTS     
LF      
HAC          
MAC          
AAC       
MFTE          
CATM      
CTIR        
Shaded variables are high correlated
 
 
Final Model  
This section provides a more detailed description of the final model from the L3 
data set (Table 21).  For the discussion of the effect of each significant predictor, it is 
assumed that all other predictors are held constant.  A taxonomy of statistical models 
from the L3 data set is included in Appendix E; variables preceded by the letter T 
indicate they have been centered on their grand mean, and variables containing the word 
log indicate log transformation 
TIME.  Time is a statistically significant predictor of WSCR (β = -0.17, p < .05).  
For each additional quarter of time, WSCR decreases by 0.17.   
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CATM.  Cost per available ton mile is a statistically significant predictor of 
WSCR (β = 3.86, p < .001).  For each $1.00 increase in cost per available ton-mile, 
WSCR increases by 3.86. 
AAC.  Available ton miles flown per aircraft is a statistically significant predictor 
of WSCR (β = 4.876, p < .001).  For each 1% increase in ATM flown per aircraft, WSCR 
increases by 0.0488. 
DEBT.  Total debt is a statistically significant predictor of WSCR (β = 23.11, p < 
.001).  For each 1% increase in debt, WSCR increases by 0.2311. 
ASTS.  Total assets are a statistically significant predictor of WSCR (β = -22.82, p 
< .001).  For each 1% increase in assets, WSCR decreases by 0.2282. 
To further understand the impact of a one unit change of each significant 
independent variable on the probability of bankruptcy, Table 24 is presented.  The impact 
of a one unit increase on the average air carrier WSCR, at TIME zero, is converted to the 
change in the probability of bankruptcy as measured by P-Score.  For example, all other 
variables constant, each additional three months after emerging from bankruptcy, the 
probability of bankruptcy decreases 4.25 percentage points.  Figure 6 shows average P-
Score plotted over time.  P-Score was calculated, as discussed in Chapter III, by 
transforming WSCR to result in the probability of bankruptcy.  As indicated by the chart, 
the probability of bankruptcy significantly decreases from the actions undertaken during 
bankruptcy protection.  After emerging from bankruptcy, the probability of bankruptcy 
does not vary substantially.  The average values over time of the remaining four 
predictors are shown in Appendix F.   
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Table 24.  Change to Probability of Bankruptcy. 
  
Amount of 
Increase 
Avg. 
WSCR 
(T = 0) 
Avg. P-
Score 
(T = 0) 
Change 
to 
WSCR 
Adj. 
WSCR 
Adj. P-
Score 
Change to 
Probability 
of 
Bankruptcy 
(pts.) 
TIME 
One quarter (3 
months) 0.13 53.32% -0.17 -0.04 49.07% -4.25 
CATM $1.00  0.13 53.32% 3.86 3.99 98.19% 44.87 
Log Transformed Variables     
AACFT 
1% (1.99 
million 
ATM/aircraft) 0.13 53.32% 0.05 0.18 54.53% 1.21 
DEBT 
1% ($43.7 
million) 0.13 53.32% 0.23 0.36 59.00% 5.68 
ASTS 
1% ($40.3 
million) 0.13 53.32% -0.23 -0.10 47.62% -5.70 
 
  
 
Figure 6.  Average P-Score. 
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DIP.  Debtor in possession financing was a significant predictor (p < .001) in four 
of the five data sets (L2, L3, L4, L5).  However, it was removed from the final models for 
each data set because, when it was included, it caused TIME to no longer be a significant 
predictor.  This is most likely due to DIP financing being measured as a dichotomous 
variable instead of continuous.  The final model from the L3 data set was fit again with 
TIME removed and DIP added.  DIP was significant (β = -2.782, p < 0.001), interpreted 
as a decrease in WSCR of -2.782 when DIP financing was secured.  This resulted in a 
decrease of 46.71 points to the probability of bankruptcy when DIP financing is a 
restructuring action.  Nine of the air carriers received no DIP financing.  While DIP was 
not included in the final model due to the effect on TIME, its effect on decreasing 
bankruptcy probability is significant.  
 
 Residuals.  Guided by Singer and Willett (2003), the assumptions of the final 
model (L3) were checked for normality and homoscedasticity.  A plot of raw residuals 
and predicted values is shown in Figure 7.  Field (2009) emphasizes that the plot should 
be a random array of dots; if the plot funnels out or any curve is visible, 
heteroscedasticity is present or the data has broken the assumption of linearity.  
Normality is tested by viewing a histogram of the residuals (Figure 8) and the normal 
probability plot (Figure G1).  Both indicate the assumption of normality may not have 
been met.  Homoscedasticity is checked by viewing plots of each predictor against 
residuals (Figure G2).  If the assumption of homoscedasticity is met, the variability at 
every predictor value will be approximately equal (Singer & Willett, 2003).  Some plots 
show more variability at each predictor value than others.  While this may indicate the 
98 
 
assumption of homoscedasticity is not met, the small sample size can make a definitive 
conclusion difficult (Singer & Willett, 2003). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Predicted values vs. residuals. 
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Figure 8.  Histogram of residuals. 
 
Summary 
 A multilevel exploratory factor analysis and multilevel model were fit to air 
carrier post-bankruptcy data.  Underlying factors were discovered in the data that 
correspond with existing turnaround literature.  Five final MLM models are presented 
with the best combination of significant predictors cross-validated against test data.  The 
final model from the L3 dataset was chosen as the best fit to explain air carrier stress over 
time. 
Methodology from Chapter III was followed, and results from the MEFA and 
MLM are included in the present chapter.  The following chapter will further discuss 
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interpretation of the factors identified with the MEFA and how they align with existing 
restructuring literature.  The significant predictors of the final model identified from 
MLM will also be interpreted and discussed for theoretical and practical application. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section explores the results of Chapter IV and answers the research questions 
posed in Chapter I.  Findings from the multilevel exploratory factor analysis (MEFA) are 
discussed and conclusions are drawn from the results of the multilevel model (MLM). 
Lastly, recommendations are given for further research in the area of air carrier 
restructuring. 
 
Discussion 
A MEFA was conducted to further understand whether air carrier restructuring 
metrics cluster into the four restructuring areas of operational, financial, managerial, and 
portfolio as proposed in literature.  Due to only one dependent variable measuring 
managerial restructuring, that variable was removed from the MEFA.  Results from the 
MEFA indicate that the selected air carrier metrics factor into three restructuring areas, 
excluding managerial: operational, financial, and portfolio.  In both the three factor and 
four factor MEFA, two operational factors were discovered: an efficiency factor and an 
aircraft utilization factor.  Efficiency was measured by cost per available ton mile 
(CATM) and miles per employee (MFTE), a cost metric and an employee productivity 
metric.  The aircraft utilization factor was measured by hours flown by aircraft (HAC) 
and tons flown per aircraft (AAC). 
In the three factor model, a combined factor measuring portfolio and financial 
restructuring actions was indicated.  This combination factor was composed of balance 
sheet variables: air carrier debt (DEBT), number of aircraft in fleet (FLET), and amount 
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of DIP financing received (DIPC).  In the four factor model, a fourth factor, financing 
and liquidity, was identified that measured the amount of DIP financing, working capital 
(WC), and DEBT.  The four factor model was the best fit, as indicated by fit statistics, 
and most similar to restructuring literature.  The results of the MEFA indicate that the 
four restructuring areas exist in air carrier metrics and are appropriate for regression.  
 The MLM identified five significant predictors in the final model.  Control 
variables were not found to be significant predictors in the final model.  
  
Time.  As discovered with the unconditional growth models and the final L3 
model, W-Score (WSCR) changed significantly over time.  On average, WSCR was 
larger, indicating the highest probability of bankruptcy during the quarter filing 
bankruptcy (TIME=0).  Subsequent to this period, WSCR decreased at .17 per quarter.  
This change equates to an average decrease in the probability of bankruptcy by 4.25 
points per quarter over the restructuring period.  Without any other changes to predictors 
in the model, the average air carrier begins with a bankruptcy probability of 53% and at 
the end of three years has a bankruptcy probability of 13%.  Individual air carrier 
differences are shown in Appendix C. 
 
Operational.  Two of the predictors in the final model were operational 
restructuring metrics: CATM and available ton miles flown per aircraft (AACFT).  A 
decrease of $1.00 per available ton mile, after bankruptcy filing, reduces the chance of a 
subsequent filing by 45 points.  For passenger air carriers, this is equivalent to a decrease 
of $0.10 per passenger mile.  The average value of CATM at T = 0 was $0.08 per 
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passenger mile and at T = 12, $0.06 per passenger mile.  This average $0.02 decrease in 
the cost per passenger mile reduced the average air carrier bankruptcy probability of 
53.3% to 51.7% at the end of three years, all else remaining the same.  
The coefficient of predictor AACFT was not in line with literature or the expected 
benefit of more available ton miles flown per aircraft.  For each 1% (1.98 million ATMs 
at T = 0) increase in AACFT, the probability of bankruptcy increases by 2.2 points.  The 
average value of AACFT at T = 0 was 198 million, and at T = 12 it was 190 million.  
This average decrease of 8 million ATMs decreased the average air carrier bankruptcy 
probability of 53.3% to 48.37% at the end of three years, all else remaining the same.  
Based on the results of the MLM, there is a significant relationship between operational 
restructuring and post-bankruptcy performance.   
 
Financial.  Only DEBT was found to be significant in the conditional growth 
model.  As debt increased, the probability of bankruptcy also increased.  The average 
value of debt over time, as shown in Figure F5, is slightly misleading.  The large decrease 
at time 12 was due to Northwest Airlines merging with Delta Airlines.  While this figure 
accurately depicts the average value of debt at T=12, this reaffirms the appropriateness of 
using MLM.  Results are not affected by this average decrease because each air carrier is 
modeled individually.  The MLM found that for every 1% increase in debt, the 
probability of bankruptcy as measured by WSCR increased 5.7 points.  At T=0, a 1% 
change is equivalent to $43.7 million.  The effect of DEBT on WSCR indicates there is a 
significant relationship between financial restructuring and post-bankruptcy performance. 
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 While not included in the final model, debtor in possession financing (DIP) was 
also a significant predictor.  As discussed in the results section, DIP was removed from 
the model because, when it was included, it caused TIME to no longer be a significant 
predictor.  This effect on time is attributed to measuring DIP financing as a dichotomous 
variable instead of continuous.  Fitting the model again with TIME removed results in a 
decrease of 46.71 points, to the probability of bankruptcy when DIP financing is a 
restructuring action at TIME zero.  The effect of DIP on decreasing bankruptcy 
probability is very significant.  It could be considered the strongest action a firm could 
take to improve financial stress.  Acquiring DIP financing reduces the probability of 
bankruptcy by 46.71 points and the average decrease of WSCR among air carriers from 
TIME = 0 to T=12 was 46.42 points.  However, considering DIP strictly as a 
management decision on whether or not to acquire is misleading.  Prior to lending 
additional financing, lenders perform their own analysis of air carrier strength.  The 
confounding issue that must be considered is that firms acquiring DIP financing received 
additional financing because they were most likely to be successful prior to being lent 
additional funds.  The combination of a potentially stronger air carrier with additional 
financing resulted in significant improvement as measured by WSCR. 
 
Managerial.  The non-significance of whether or not the CEO was replaced is 
most likely a result of the measurement.  In this study, measuring if the CEO was 
replaced only occurred if the replacement was made during the quarter of bankruptcy or 
during the restructuring period afterwards.  Six air carriers (Table C2) replaced the CEO 
in the quarter prior to filing bankruptcy, but this study did not consider the effect of CEO 
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replacement prior to bankruptcy.  Future studies may explore the effect of replacing the 
CEO prior to bankruptcy. 
 
Portfolio.  The only significant portfolio variable was total assets (ASTS).  The 
average value over time was very similar to DEBT, as shown in Figure F6.  Like DEBT, 
the significant decrease in period 12 is due to Northwest Airlines no longer reporting 
values after merging with Delta Airlines.  Again, missing data such as in this case does 
not cause an issue for MLM.  The MLM found that for every 1% increase in assets, the 
probability of bankruptcy as measured by WSCR decreased 5.7 points.  At T = 0, a 1% 
change is equivalent to $40.3 million.  Rather than assuming this variable is used to only 
measure management changes during restructuring, it is also acting as a control variable 
for the size of the air carriers.  The results of ASTS could indicate that the larger air 
carriers have less financial stress.  However, considering the effect of DEBT as discussed 
above, a 1% increase in assets financed 100% with debt, nets to an approximate zero 
change to WSCR.  In order for the larger firm to be less financially stressed, it must be 
financed with equity rather than debt.  The interaction between DEBT and ASTS 
indicates that size of the air carrier does not matter as much as how the assets are 
financed.  Whether an air carrier chooses to increase assets, for example through a 
merger, or reduce assets by selling aircraft or infrastructure, management’s efforts should 
focus on relative debt reduction.  The effect of ASTS on WSCR indicates there is a 
significant relationship between financial restructuring and post-bankruptcy performance. 
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Conclusions 
This study examined the existence and effect of the four air carrier restructuring 
areas of operational, financial, managerial, and portfolio during the bankruptcy and post-
bankruptcy period.  Quarterly data from 25 U.S. air carriers were collected for the three-
year period after emerging from bankruptcy.  MEFA was conducted to explore the 
underlying factor structure of the air carrier measurements, and MLM was used to 
identify the significant strategic actions affecting post-bankruptcy performance as 
measured by the untransformed P-Score, WSCR. 
The MEFA confirmed the existence of the four restructuring areas in the air 
carrier data.  Additionally, the MEFA found two operational factors: an efficiency factor 
and an aircraft utilization factor.  Future research may consider studying these factors 
separately when further analyzing operational restructuring strategies.  Based on the 
results of the MLM, the research questions are addressed: 
 
RQ1: What is the relationship between operational restructuring on post-
bankruptcy performance during the post-bankruptcy period? 
There is a significant relationship between operational restructuring on post-
bankruptcy performance during the bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy period.  As the cost 
per available ton mile decreased, WSCR also decreased.  This relationship is similar to 
restructuring literature in other industries where a lower cost of production is favorable 
for a firm.     
Available ton miles flown per aircraft has an unexpected relationship with WSCR.  
As aircraft utilization decreases, or ATMs flown per aircraft, WSCR also decreases.  This 
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significant relationship is counter-intuitive as it contradicts business strategy of 
improving aircraft utilization.  This unexpected relationship may indicate that WSCR is 
not ideal for measuring the effects of aircraft utilization.  The weak correlation between 
WSCR and AAC shown in Appendix A furthers strengthens this proposal.  As discussed 
in the recommendation section, additional dependent variables may be added to better 
capture the effect of aircraft utilization.  Based on these results, it is important that 
management focuses on reducing operating costs.  
 
RQ2: What is the relationship between financial restructuring on post-bankruptcy 
performance during the post-bankruptcy period? 
There is a significant relationship between financial restructuring on post-
bankruptcy performance during the bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy period.  Total debt is 
a significant predictor of air carrier distress.  Increasing debt has an adverse effect on 
performance.  Debtor-in-possession financing is also a significant predictor and has a 
strong impact on post-bankruptcy performance.  These results indicate management 
should attempt to reduce total debt to improve air carrier distress and that the approval of 
DIP financing is strongly related to post-bankruptcy performance. 
 
RQ3: What is the relationship between managerial restructuring on post-
bankruptcy performance during the post-bankruptcy period?  
The results from this study showed no relationship between managerial 
restructuring on post-bankruptcy performance during the bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy 
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period.  While a relationship may exist when the CEO is replaced prior to bankruptcy, it 
is outside the scope of this study.  
 
RQ4: What is the relationship between portfolio restructuring on post-bankruptcy 
performance during the post-bankruptcy period? 
There is a significant relationship between portfolio restructuring on post-
bankruptcy performance during the bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy period.  Total assets 
are inversely related to post-bankruptcy stress; as assets increase, performance improves.  
Management must also consider the relationship of post-bankruptcy performance on debt 
when deciding whether or not to restructure assets.  
 
Methodology and Data.  Multilevel modeling is a very appropriate method for 
this research.  Eight of the air carriers had missing data over the three year period.  The 
ability of MLM to handle missing data made this study possible; without the use of these 
eight air carriers, there would be insufficient data for analysis.  The Department of 
Transportation (DOT) dataset is also very useful because it was submitted by air carriers 
in a common format collected by the same entity for the 34 year period.  This data 
consistency made treatment and analysis similar among air carriers.  As some of the air 
carriers are no longer operating, DOT data are the only readily available data.  As 
discussed in prior chapters, the main limitation in this study was minimal data.  To 
maximize the number of air carriers available for analysis a large time period was used 
(1979 – 2012).  While only 25 large air carriers are used for analysis, this included the 
entire population. 
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Measuring the restructuring period from the quarter of filing bankruptcy is also 
very beneficial.  The public declaration of bankruptcy was a common signal identifying 
stress that was not dependent on other measurements.  Using any other measurement to 
begin tracking restructuring performance may have been less obvious or conclusive.  The 
design and data source made this study robust and appropriate for the research questions. 
 
Practical and Theoretical Implications.  This study has contributed 
theoretically and practically to air carrier restructuring theory.  This is the first study to 
explore air carrier specific restructuring metrics for underlying factors and the first to 
measure restructuring strategies in all large air carriers that have emerged from Chapter 
11 bankruptcy.  
MEFA results show air carrier restructuring strategy factors to be similar with 
factors found in non-air carrier studies.  In the 4-Factor model, two operational factors – a 
portfolio factor and a financial factor – were identified.  This suggests that the four factor 
approach found in restructuring literature also applies to air carrier restructuring research. 
This study is also the first to apply MLM to bankruptcy restructuring research.  
The robustness and versatility of MLM due to its ability to handle missing data and 
varying time periods make it appropriate for further application in the restructuring field.  
Additionally, this is the first study to measure the impact of restructuring factors on post-
bankruptcy performance in the airline industry.  
Practical contributions of this study include providing stakeholders, owners, debt 
holders, and management of bankrupt air carriers guidance for restructuring.  Based on 
MLM results, each restructuring area, except managerial, has a significant influence on 
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bankruptcy probability, as measured by WSCR.  Air carrier management should strive to 
reduce the cost of transport per mile; CATM could be improved by reducing cost, 
increasing ATMs, or both.  
As management seeks to employ financial and portfolio restructuring, it should 
direct its efforts toward reducing financial leverage in the firm.  An equal reduction of 
debt and assets results in almost a net zero change in air carrier performance.  The 
challenge for management is to reduce the ratio of debt to assets, thus decreasing 
financial stress.  While management should seek to decrease leverage during the 
restructuring period, results show that acquiring DIP financing significantly reduced 
financial stress.  This would indicate that if a bankrupt air carrier required additional 
financing for restructuring, DIP financing should be solicited.  Acquiring DIP financing 
should be a strong indicator to external stakeholders that financial stress has significantly 
decreased.  The strong effect of DIP financing may be partially due to lenders only 
financing the strongest of air carriers in bankruptcy.  Either way, this study found that the 
most significant indication of improved financial stress is the receipt of DIP financing.   
Based on this study, there is no relationship between managerial restructuring and 
air carrier financial stress during the period measured.  The effect of CEO replacement 
that occurred prior to bankruptcy filing is outside the scope of this study.  Additional 
research of managerial restructuring is needed to better understand this strategy among 
distressed air carriers.  To improve air carrier performance during bankruptcy and 
restructuring, management should attempt to reduce the cost of transport, improve 
employee efficiency, consider deleveraging, and acquire DIP financing.   
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Recommendations 
 Future research in the area of air carrier restructuring will benefit greatly from 
additional data.  Additional data will allow for the inclusion of level 2 predictors to 
explain variance associated with differences between passenger and cargo air carriers 
along with differences in air carrier size.  Adding additional level 2 predictors may also 
appropriately capture the effects of variables such as AAC where an inverse relationship 
exists between aircraft utilization and air carrier success.  Further, additional data may be 
obtained by expanding the scope of air carriers beyond the U.S. 
 Future research may consider using a multivariate growth model.  Rather than use 
of a single dependent variable composed of a combined score of metrics, a multivariate 
growth model would allow the researcher to select a number of dependent variables.  
While a combined metric such as the W-Score has advantages, multiple dependent 
variables would give researchers more flexibility.  Another addition to the multilevel 
model that may be useful is analysis with a cross-classified multilevel model.  In a cross-
classified multilevel model, measurements that belong to more than one air carrier can be 
explored.  For example, in the case of the Delta Airlines bankruptcy, Comair filed 
bankruptcy the same day because it was a subsidiary.  Measurements made of Comair 
also belonged to and were related to Delta Airlines.  Cross-classified models may allow 
for further exploration of smaller subsidiary air carriers owned by larger air carriers. 
 Additional data would be useful for all of the recommendations in this section.  
However, a change that could be made to this study whether additional data were 
available or not, is adjusting the point at which turnaround actions is measured.  As 
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discussed earlier, this study may not have sufficiently captured CEO changes as a 
restructuring strategy due to measuring restructuring strategies beginning at bankruptcy 
filing.  Future research may consider selecting another indicator of financial distress, 
rather than bankruptcy filing, to begin measuring restructuring actions and capture 
strategies employed earlier in the turnaround process. 
This study introduced generic restructuring strategies to air carrier research.  First, 
by exploring for underlying restructuring factors in air carrier metrics and secondly, 
through the application of multilevel modeling of air carrier restructuring strategies.  
Results from this study emphasize the importance of reducing air carrier operating costs 
while improving aircraft efficiency.  These operating strategies coupled with DIP 
financing and decreasing relative debt result in reduced financial stress.  Future research 
should consider additional dependent variables and level 2 predictors for further 
understanding of air carrier restructuring.  Applying these recommendations by building 
upon this initial study will continue to fill the knowledge gap in air carrier restructuring. 
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APPENDIX B 
Air Carrier Data 
B1 Data Removed due to Listwise Deletion 
B2 Air Carrier Specific Data Collection Issues   
130 
 
Table B1.  Data Removed due to Listwise Deletion. 
Training 
Data Set 
Air Carriers 
Removed due to 
Listwise Deletion 
Number of 
Air Carriers 
used for 
MLM 
Valid 
Cases 
Excluded 
Cases 
Total 
Cases 
L1 ATL, TWA1 18 196 64 260 
L2 ATL, TWA1 18 212 48 260 
L3 ATL, TWA1 18 197 63 260 
L4 TWA1 19 213 47 260 
L5 ATL 19 214 46 260 
 
  
Table C2.  Air Carrier Specific Data Collection Issues. 
Air Carrier Year Quarter Data Issue 
Allegiant Air 
2002 - 
2003 
1-4 All 
Due to air carrier size, Allegiant was considered a 
small carrier for part of the data collection period. 
Biannual measurements were divided in half to 
calculate quarterly income statement values.  Q2 and 
Q4 Balance sheet values were used for the quarter 
prior's values due the biannual measurement period. 
Aloha Airlines 2008 1 Aircraft Operated 
Value not reported to DOT.  The previous quarters 
value was used. 
Aloha Airlines   CEO  
The CEO was replaced prior to the quarter filing 
bankruptcy. 
ATA Airlines 2004 4 Aircraft Operated No values reported to DOT for 2004.  2003 count was 
used for pre-bankruptcy value. 
ATA Airlines 2007 1-4 Aircraft Operated 
No values reported to DOT for 2007.  2006 count was 
used. 
Atlas Air/Polar Air 
Cargo 
2004 1 Aircraft Operated 
2003 Q4 value was used as it was more accurate than 
the 2004 Q1 value which included two months of 
changes in bankruptcy. 
America West Airlines 1991 2 Aircraft Operated 
Value not reported to DOT and unable to find.  Value 
remains missing. 
Braniff International 1982 2 Employees Value not reported to DOT; 1981 value used. 
Braniff International   Financial 
1983 (Q3, Q4) 1984 (Q1) not reported to DOT.  Post-
bankruptcy data began with data 4 quarters after 
emerging. 
Continental Airlines 1 1983 3 Aircraft Operated 
Value not reported to DOT and unable to find.  Value 
remains missing. 
Continental Airlines 1 1983 3 Employees Value not reported to DOT; 1982 value used. 
1
3
1
 
  
Hawaiian Airlines 1   CEO  
The CEO was replaced prior to the quarter filing 
bankruptcy. 
Markair 1992 2 Aircraft Operated 
Value not reported to DOT and unable to find.  Value 
remains missing. 
Mesa Air  2013 1 Aircraft Operated No values reported to DOT.  2012 Q4 count was used. 
Sun Country 1 2002 3 Employees 
No values reported to DOT.  Value interpolated on 
quarters before and after. 
Sun Country Airlines 2   CEO  
The CEO was replaced prior to the quarter filing 
bankruptcy. 
Sun Country Airlines 2 2013 1 Aircraft Operated No values reported to DOT.  2012 Q4 count was used. 
Trans World Airlines 1 1993-1995 1-4 Aircraft Operated 
Value not reported to DOT and unable to find.  Value 
remains missing. 
Trans World Airlines 2   CEO  
The CEO was replaced prior to the quarter filing 
bankruptcy. 
United Airlines 2008 4 Retained Earnings 
DOT Form 41 data says 11,001,432 and is incorrect 
based on Balance Sheet analysis.  2008 annual report 
says 5,199,000.  Replaced with 5,199,000. 
US Airways 1   CEO  
The CEO was replaced prior to the quarter filing 
bankruptcy. 
US Airways 2     CEO  
The CEO was replaced prior to the quarter filing 
bankruptcy. 
1
3
2
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APPENDIX C 
Air Carrier W-Score, P-Score and Restructuring Strategy 
C1 Allegiant Air 
C2 Aloha Airlines 
 
C3 ATA Airlines 
C4 Atlas Air/Polar Air Cargo 
C5 America West Airlines 
C6 Braniff International 
C7 Comair 
C8 Continental Airlines 1st Bankruptcy 
C9 Continental Airlines 2nd Bankruptcy 
C10 Delta Airlines 
C11 Frontier Airlines 
C12 Hawaiian Airlines 1st Bankruptcy 
C13 Hawaiian Airlines 2nd Bankruptcy 
C14 Kitty Hawk 
C15 Markair 
C16 Mesa Air 
C17 Mesaba Airlines 
C18 Northwest Airlines 
C19 Sun Country 1st Bankruptcy 
C20 Sun Country Airlines 2nd Bankruptcy 
C21 Trans World Airlines 1st Bankruptcy 
C22 Trans World Airlines 2nd Bankruptcy 
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C23 United Airlines 
C24 US Airways 1st Bankruptcy 
C25 US Airways 2nd Bankruptcy 
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Figure C1.  Allegiant Air W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C1.  Allegiant Air Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 4,620 64,005 +1285% 
CATM 1.19 0.77 -35% 
DEBT 14,677 56,227 +283% 
DIP 0 0 No DIP 
AAC        1,113,354            3,155,953  +183% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR 7.46 -4.15  
P-Score 99.94% 1.55% -98.40 pts. 
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Figure C2.  Aloha Airlines W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C2. Aloha Airlines Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 152,833 216,951 +42% 
CATM 1.02 1.32 +30% 
DEBT 305,302 304,152 -0% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC        3,594,859            3,491,081  -3% 
TIME 0 9 N/A 
WSCR 0.70 0.73  
P-Score 66.88% 67.53% 0.66 pts. 
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Figure C3.  ATA Airlines W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C3.  ATA Airlines Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 318,375 404,984 +27% 
CATM 1.31 0.68 -48% 
DEBT 580,549 377,746 -35% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC        9,164,796          47,035,114  +413% 
TIME 0 6 N/A 
WSCR -2.76 -2.64  
P-Score 5.93% 6.67% 0.73 pts. 
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Figure C4.  Atlas Air/Polar Air Cargo W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C4.  Atlas Air/Polar Air Cargo Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 1,436,383 887,183 -38% 
CATM 0.15 0.14 -3% 
DEBT 1,461,905 570,508 -61% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC      31,190,775          72,633,430  +133% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR -0.04 -5.26  
P-Score 48.97% 0.52% -48.45 pts. 
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Figure C5.  America West Airlines W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
Table C5.  America West Airlines Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 1,230,116 1,583,725 +29% 
CATM 0.58 0.59 +1% 
DEBT 1,250,532 937,347 -25% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC missing           7,189,374  N/A 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR -1.35 -4.12  
P-Score 20.56% 1.60% -18.96 pts. 
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Figure C6.  Braniff International W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
Table C6.  Braniff International Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 877,546 93,678 -89% 
CATM 0.29 0.22 -25% 
DEBT 910,637 56,303 -94% 
DIP 0 0 No DIP 
AAC        7,303,934          12,786,541  +75% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR -0.40 -2.21  
P-Score 40.08% 9.85% -30.23 pts. 
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Figure C7.  Comair W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C7.  Comair Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 2,391,313 945,320 -60% 
CATM 1.13 0.78 -30% 
DEBT 1,596,267 763,835 -52% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC        1,812,075            1,200,116  -34% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR -1.68 -0.61  
P-Score 15.68% 35.26% 19.58 pts. 
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Figure C8.  Continental Airlines 1st Bankruptcy W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C8.  Continental Airlines 1st Bankruptcy Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 1,110,287 4,016,479 +262% 
CATM 0.31 0.26 -14% 
DEBT 1,158,120 3,903,210 +237% 
DIP 0 0 No DIP 
AAC missing         13,881,224  N/A 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR -0.92 -1.69  
P-Score 28.44% 15.55% -12.89 pts. 
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Figure C9.  Continental Airlines 2nd Bankruptcy W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C9.  Continental Airlines 2nd Bankruptcy Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 3,091,744 4,084,843 +32% 
CATM 0.66 0.76 +14% 
DEBT 4,816,897 3,694,403 -23% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC        7,026,434            5,298,656  -25% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR 0.53 -2.48  
P-Score 62.85% 7.76% -55.10 pts. 
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Figure C10.  Delta Airlines W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C10.  Delta Airlines Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 19,587,128 44,018,556 +125% 
CATM 0.82 1.00 +21% 
DEBT 24,075,103 44,173,320 +83% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC      10,797,507            9,128,322  -15% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR 0.41 0.54  
P-Score 60.08% 63.15% 3.08 pts. 
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
W
S
C
R
Time
DELT
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
P
-S
co
re
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 o
f 
B
a
n
k
ru
p
tc
y
Time
DELT
145 
 
 
 
Figure C11.  Frontier Airlines W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C11.  Frontier Airlines Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 1,088,225 850,555 -22% 
CATM 1.00 1.00 -0% 
DEBT 982,035 734,089 -25% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC        7,933,165            6,267,818  -21% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR -2.37 -2.76  
P-Score 8.59% 5.93% -2.65 pts. 
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Figure C12.  Hawaiian Airlines 1st Bankruptcy W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C12.  Hawaiian Airlines 1st Bankruptcy Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 119,475 208,502 +75% 
CATM 0.66 0.52 -21% 
DEBT 306,522 124,863 -59% 
DIP 0 0 No DIP 
AAC        6,321,696            8,892,015  +41% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR 4.81 -4.87  
P-Score 99.19% 0.76% -98.43 pts. 
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Figure C13.  Hawaiian Airlines 2nd Bankruptcy W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C13.  Hawaiian Airlines 2nd Bankruptcy Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 240,105 848,712 +253% 
CATM 0.58 0.72 +23% 
DEBT 398,860 810,069 +103% 
DIP 0 0 No DIP 
AAC      11,223,578          11,467,651  +2% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR 0.01 -3.09  
P-Score 50.13% 4.34% -45.80 pts. 
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Figure C14.  Kitty Hawk W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C14.  Kitty Hawk Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 181,878 7,582 -96% 
CATM 0.45 0.03 -94% 
DEBT 98,428 4,309 -96% 
DIP 0 0 No DIP 
AAC        2,724,087            1,881,754  -31% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR -7.38 -6.60  
P-Score 0.06% 0.14% 0.07 pts. 
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Figure C15.  Markair W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C15.  Markair Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 205,980 150,600 -27% 
CATM 0.59 0.67 +13% 
DEBT 201,203 222,219 +10% 
DIP 0 0 No DIP 
AAC missing           7,822,636  N/A 
TIME 0 5 N/A 
WSCR -0.96 0.41  
P-Score 27.78% 60.14% 32.36 pts. 
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Figure C16.  Mesa Air W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C16.  Mesa Air Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 1,233,140 748,187 -39% 
CATM 1.04 0.65 -38% 
DEBT 1,011,178 739,909 -27% 
DIP 0 0 No DIP 
AAC        2,311,618            1,731,746  -25% 
TIME 0 9 N/A 
WSCR -1.94 -1.28  
P-Score 12.62% 21.76% 9.15 pts. 
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Figure C17.  Mesaba Airlines W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C17.  Mesaba Airlines Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 151,955 121,341 -20% 
CATM 1.09 0.55 -49% 
DEBT 103,426 66,792 -35% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC           920,055            1,782,318  +94% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR -5.93 -9.56  
P-Score 0.26% 0.01% -0.26 pts. 
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Figure C18.  Northwest Airlines W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C18.  Northwest Airlines Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 18,706,101 19,289,102 +3% 
CATM 0.89 0.98 +10% 
DEBT 17,412,776 17,187,256 -1% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC      10,390,157            9,069,580  -13% 
TIME 0 11 N/A 
WSCR -1.52 -0.98  
P-Score 17.92% 27.29% 9.37 pts. 
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Figure C19.  Sun Country 1st Bankruptcy W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C19.  Sun Country 1st Bankruptcy Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 16,526 62,720 +280% 
CATM 2.09 0.53 -74% 
DEBT 169,326 54,387 -68% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC        6,042,941            9,497,791  +57% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR 19.46 -5.05  
P-Score 100.00% 0.64% -99.36 pts. 
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Figure C20.  Sun Country Airlines 2nd Bankruptcy W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C20.  Sun Country Airlines 2nd Bankruptcy Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 100,681 158,406 +57% 
CATM 0.66 0.85 +29% 
DEBT 135,554 88,237 -35% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC       7,204,056            7,348,311  +2% 
TIME 0 9 N/A 
WSCR -1.35 -5.99  
P-Score 20.56% 0.25% -20.31 pts. 
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Figure C21.  Trans World Airlines 1st Bankruptcy W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C21.  Trans World Airlines 1st Bankruptcy Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 2,749,093 2,554,535 -7% 
CATM 0.67 0.61 -8% 
DEBT 3,633,754 3,089,638 -15% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC      39,315,318 missing N/A 
TIME 0 7 N/A 
WSCR -0.65 -0.92  
P-Score 34.30% 28.55% -5.75 pts. 
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Figure C22.  Trans World Airlines 2nd Bankruptcy W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C22.  Trans World Airlines 2nd Bankruptcy Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 2,554,535 2,928,670 +15% 
CATM 0.61 0.68 +12% 
DEBT 3,089,638 2,707,383 -12% 
DIP 0 0 No DIP 
AAC        6,551,698            5,883,974  -10% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR -0.92 -1.79  
P-Score 28.55% 14.26% -14.29 pts. 
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Figure C23.  United Airlines W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C23.  United Airlines Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 24,856,178 19,461,223 -22% 
CATM 0.75 1.03 +37% 
DEBT 25,697,044 21,927,048 -15% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC      10,688,489          12,280,671  +15% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR 0.15 -0.40  
P-Score 53.71% 40.03% -13.67 pts. 
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Figure C24.  US Airways 1st Bankruptcy W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C24.  US Airways 1st Bankruptcy Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 9,953,888 8,497,647 -15% 
CATM 0.87 0.95 +9% 
DEBT 11,130,845 8,710,038 -22% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC        7,920,714            7,319,512  -8% 
TIME 0 7 N/A 
WSCR 1.23 -1.26  
P-Score 77.42% 22.03% -55.39 pts. 
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Figure C25.  US Airways 2nd Bankruptcy W-Score and P-Score.  
 
 
 
Table C25.  US Airways 2nd Bankruptcy Restructuring Strategy. 
Variable 
Bankrupt 
Period 
Final 
Restructuring 
Period 
Restructuring 
Change 
ASTS 8,497,647 7,817,772 -8% 
CATM 0.95 1.44 +52% 
DEBT 8,710,038 6,809,261 -22% 
DIP 0 1 Yes DIP 
AAC        7,319,512            7,557,887  +3% 
TIME 0 12 N/A 
WSCR -1.26 -2.64  
P-Score 22.03% 6.65% -15.38 pts. 
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APPENDIX D 
Unconditional Growth Model Tables 
D1 Data L1 Unconditional Growth Models  
D2 Data L3 Unconditional Growth Models  
D3 Data L4 Unconditional Growth Models  
D4 Data L5 Unconditional Growth Models  
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Table D1.  Data L1 Unconditional Growth Models. 
    Model B Model C Model D 
Intercept  -.999 (.510) 2.131*** (.603) 2.224*** (.607) 
 TIME -.210** (.064) -.697*** (.181) -.989** (.314) 
 TIME2   .044** (.015) .115 (.065) 
 TIME3     -.004 (.004) 
        
Variance Components       
 
Level 1 
(Within) 5.244*** (1.539) 5.112*** (1.567) 5.002*** (1.516) 
 Level 1 rho 0.774*** (.068) .765*** (.074) .761*** (.075) 
 
Level 2 
(Between) .793 (1.346) 1.313 (1.503) 1.385 (1.482) 
 
Level 2 rho 
(ICC) .131  .204  .217  
        
Pseudo 
R2  .299  .317  .331  
Deviance        
 AIC 835.912  743.637  744.359  
  BIC 852.948   763.306   767.306   
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p ≤ 0.001 **p ≤ 0.01 *p ≤ 0.05  
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Table D2.  Data L2 Unconditional Growth Models. 
    Model B Model C Model D 
Intercept  -1.740*** (.419) -1.142* (.483) 2.0168*** (.597) 
 TIME -.169*** (.041) -.506*** (.141) -1.234*** (.348) 
 TIME2   .029* (.011) .182** (.069) 
 TIME3     -.008* (.004) 
        
Variance Components       
 
Level 1 
(Within) 4.963*** (.482) 4.822*** (.468) 5.082*** (.516) 
 Level 1 rho .012 (.105) .009 (.103) -.069 (.112) 
 
Level 2 
(Between) 2.137** (.803) 2.169** (.808) 2.482* (.958) 
 
Level 2 rho 
(ICC) .301  .310  .328  
        
Pseudo 
R2  .155  .179  .135  
Deviance        
 AIC 1116.185  1112.078  995.479  
  BIC 1133.609   1132.987   1018.975   
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p ≤ 0.001 **p ≤ 0.01 *p ≤ 0.05  
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Table D3.  Data L4 Unconditional Growth Models. 
    Model B Model C Model D 
Intercept  -1.022** (.412) -.309 (.508) 2.762*** (.596) 
 TIME -.227*** (.058) -.660*** (.192) -1.320** (.426) 
 TIME2   .038* (.016) .179* (.086) 
 TIME3     -.008 (.005) 
        
Variance Components       
 
Level 1 
(Within) 6.873*** (.922) 6.653*** (.870) 6.578*** (.841) 
 Level 1 rho .257* (.130) .246 (.127) .174 (.151) 
 
Level 2 
(Between) .443 (.553) .469 (.533) .643 (.571) 
 
Level 2 rho 
(ICC) .061  .066  .089  
        
Pseudo 
R2  .204  .229  .238  
Deviance        
 AIC 1090.109  1086.616  1025.118  
  BIC 1107.255   1107.192   1048.648   
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p ≤ 0.001 **p ≤ 0.01 *p ≤ 0.05  
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Table D4.  Data L5 Unconditional Growth Models. 
    Model B Model C Model D 
Intercept  -1.373** (.456) -.742 (.538) 2.321*** (.653) 
 TIME -.230*** (.048) -.586** (.171) -1.190** (.411) 
 TIME2   .030* (.014) .164 (.082) 
 TIME3     -.008 (.005) 
        
Variance Components       
 
Level 1 
(Within) 5.647*** (.731) 5.637*** (.735) 5.956*** (.802) 
 Level 1 rho .161 (.183) .197 (.159) .175 (.177) 
 
Level 2 
(Between) 2.148* (.893) 2.100* (.891) 2.293* (1.000) 
 
Level 2 rho 
(ICC) .276  .271  .278  
        
Pseudo 
R2  .275  .276  .235  
Deviance        
 AIC 1103.101  1100.589  1024.286  
  BIC 1120.378   1121.321   1047.848   
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***p ≤ 0.001 **p ≤ 0.01 *p ≤ 0.05  
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APPENDIX E 
Taxonomy of L3 Dataset Models Table 
E1 Taxonomy of L3 Dataset Models 
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Table E1.  Taxonomy of L3 Dataset Models. 
  Model A   Model B Model C Model D 
Intercept .316  1.552 ** 2.202 *** 2.610 *** 
TIME   -.239 *** -.612 ** -1.163 ** 
TIME*TIME     .032  .156  
TIME*TIME*TIME       -.007  
TCATM         
TCAPX         
TLF         
TDE         
TDIP         
TWC         
TCEO         
TFLET         
TCGDP         
TCJF         
TCNOC         
TCTIR         
TLOGDFTE         
TLOGHAC         
TLOGAAC         
TLOGDEBT         
TLOGASTS         
TLOGNCA         
TLOGMAC         
TAFTE         
TMFTE         
TFTE         
TRATM         
Variance Components               
Level 1 (Within) 8.709 *** 7.099 *** 6.922 *** 6.813 *** 
Level 1 rho .374 ** .192  .182  .170  
Level 2 (Between) 1.948  2.318 * 2.379 * 2.387 * 
Level 2 rho (ICC) 0.183   .246   .256   .259   
Pseudo R2     0.185   0.205   0.218   
Deviance         
AIC 981.976  971.313  969.896  970.053  
BIC 995.109   987.729   989.595   993.036   
***p ≤ 0.001 **p ≤ 0.01 *p ≤ 0.05      
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Table E1.  Taxonomy of L3 Dataset Models (cont.). 
 Model E Model F Model G Model H 
Intercept 1.271 ** 1.284 ** 1.176  1.265 * 
TIME -.191 ** -.193 ** -.182 * -.190 ** 
TIME*TIME         
TIME*TIME*TIME         
TCATM 3.031 *** 3.028 *** 2.961 *** 3.051 *** 
TCAPX   .605      
TLF     -2.128    
TDE       .004  
TDIP         
TWC         
TCEO         
TFLET         
TCGDP         
TCJF         
TCNOC         
TCTIR         
TLOGDFTE         
TLOGHAC         
TLOGAAC         
TLOGDEBT         
TLOGASTS         
TLOGNCA         
TLOGMAC         
TAFTE         
TMFTE         
TFTE         
TRATM         
Variance Components               
Level 1 (Within) 6.997 *** 7.016 *** 6.700 *** 6.925 *** 
Level 1 rho .309 * .314 * .253  .299 * 
Level 2 (Between) 3.128 * 3.071 * 3.263 * 3.129 * 
Level 2 rho (ICC) .309   .304   .328   .311   
Pseudo R2 0.197   0.194   0.231   0.205   
Deviance         
AIC 960.985  962.531  962.860  962.555  
BIC 980.685   985.513   985.842   985.538   
***p ≤ 0.001 **p ≤ 0.01 *p ≤ 0.05       
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Table E1.  Taxonomy of L3 Dataset Models (cont.). 
 Model I Model J Model K Model L 
Intercept .544  .676  .522  1.243 * 
TIME -.077  -.099  -.071  -.189 ** 
TIME*TIME         
TIME*TIME*TIME         
TCATM 4.284 *** 3.965 *** 4.175 *** 2.961 *** 
TCAPX         
TLF         
TDE         
TDIP -3.229 *** -3.109 *** -3.145 ***   
TWC   -.753      
TCEO     -.271    
TFLET       .002  
TCGDP         
TCJF         
TCNOC         
TCTIR         
TLOGDFTE         
TLOGHAC         
TLOGAAC         
TLOGDEBT         
TLOGASTS         
TLOGNCA         
TLOGMAC         
TAFTE         
TMFTE         
TFTE         
TRATM         
Variance Components               
Level 1 (Within) 7.306 *** 7.105 *** 7.227 *** 7.000 *** 
Level 1 rho .452 *** .426 *** .445 *** .307 * 
Level 2 (Between) 2.724  2.120  2.828  2.920 * 
Level 2 rho (ICC) .272   .230   .281   .294   
Pseudo R2 0.161   0.184   0.170   0.196   
Deviance         
AIC 943.859  943.232  945.739  962.428  
BIC 966.842   969.498   972.004   985.411   
***p ≤ 0.001 **p ≤ 0.01 *p ≤ 0.05       
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Table E1.  Taxonomy of L3 Dataset Models (cont.). 
 Model M Model N Model O Model P 
Intercept .875  .758  .835  1.158 * 
TIME -.156 * -.124  -.126  -.130  
TIME*TIME         
TIME*TIME*TIME         
TCATM 4.112 *** 4.223 *** 4.029 *** 5.096 *** 
TCAPX         
TLF         
TDE         
TDIP         
TWC         
TCEO         
TFLET         
TCGDP .377        
TCJF .075        
TCNOC -.062        
TCTIR .000  .000 *** .000 ** .000 *** 
TLOGDFTE     -1.675    
TLOGHAC       -8.171  
TLOGAAC       6.801 ** 
TLOGDEBT         
TLOGASTS         
TLOGNCA         
TLOGMAC         
TAFTE         
TMFTE         
TFTE         
TRATM         
Variance Components               
Level 1 (Within) 6.073 *** 6.492 *** 6.660 *** 6.719 *** 
Level 1 rho .230  .285 * .301 * .368 ** 
Level 2 (Between) 3.031 * 2.502 * 1.863  1.047  
Level 2 rho (ICC) .333   .278   .219   .135   
Pseudo R2 0.303   0.255   0.235   0.228   
Deviance         
AIC 952.448  949.627  950.613  938.586  
BIC 985.280   972.610   976.878   968.135   
***p ≤ 0.001 **p ≤ 0.01 *p ≤ 0.05       
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Table E1.  Taxonomy of L3 Dataset Models (cont.). 
 Model Q Model R Model S Model T 
Intercept .833  .950  .884  1.340 * 
TIME -.114  -.123  -.124  -.169 * 
TIME*TIME         
TIME*TIME*TIME         
TCATM 4.524 *** 4.619 *** 4.277 *** 3.858 *** 
TCAPX         
TLF         
TDE         
TDIP         
TWC         
TCEO         
TFLET         
TCGDP         
TCJF         
TCNOC         
TCTIR .000 *** .000 *** .000 ***   
TLOGDFTE         
TLOGHAC         
TLOGAAC 3.505 ** 5.141  3.169 * 4.876 *** 
TLOGDEBT 21.754 *** 23.300 *** 24.613 *** 23.113 *** 
TLOGASTS -20.663 *** -19.094 *** -20.157 *** -22.816 *** 
TLOGNCA         
TLOGMAC   -2.456      
TAFTE         
TMFTE   .102      
TFTE   .000  .000    
TRATM         
Variance Components               
Level 1 (Within) 5.946 *** 5.697 *** 5.731 *** 6.532 *** 
Level 1 rho .334 * .280  .298 * .402 ** 
Level 2 (Between) 1.486  1.128  1.349  2.270  
Level 2 rho (ICC) .200   .165   .191   .258   
Pseudo R2 0.317   0.346   0.342   0.250   
Deviance         
AIC 926.390  928.827  925.516  935.064  
BIC 959.222   971.508   961.631   964.613   
***p ≤ 0.001 **p ≤ 0.01 *p ≤ 0.05       
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APPENDIX F 
Average Values of Significant Predictors 
F1 Average CATM 
F2 Average AAC 
F3 Average DEBT 
F4 Average ASTS 
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Figure F1.  Average CATM. 
 
 
 
 
Figure F2.  Average AAC. 
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Figure F3.  Average DEBT. 
 
 
 
Figure F4.  Average ASTS. 
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APPENDIX G 
MLM Residuals 
G1 Normal Probability Plot of Residuals 
G2 Residuals against Predictors 
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Figure G1.  Normal probability plot of residuals. 
 
 
 
 
Figure G2.  Residuals against predictors. 
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Figure G2.  Residuals against predictors (continued). 
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Figure G2.  Residuals against predictors (continued). 
 
 
